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Abstract
Once an Amazon Web Services employee took numerous servers offline that should have
stayed online. The resulting US-East outage originated from a single integer that was
incorrectly inserted in a configuration file. The configuration file defined the number
of servers that should be up and running. The change was legal, but the number of
servers that where taken offline was to high. We took the idea of such simple errors and
applied them to continuous deployment pipelines. Continuous deployment pipelines are
the next evolutionary step in continuous build pipelines. The Amazon Cloud is a highly
automated environment. Pipelines are similar to the Amazon cloud a highly automated
environment. Small errors can have potential catastrophic outcomes. We interviewed
two experts in two differently sized companies which are using continuous integration
and continuous delivery pipelines. Based on the information that was provided by both
experts about the state of current continuous pipelines, we derived influence factors that
are problematic in continuous deployment pipelines. The discovered influence factors
already exist in currently used continuous integration/delivery pipelines were they do
pose less significant threats than in continuous deployment pipelines. The enhanced
automated deployment process of continuous deployment pipelines are making these
factors problematic. We developed classification and improvement methods for each of
the discovered influence factors. These methods can be used to strengthen a pipeline
against unintended configuration changes.
iii

Kurzfassung
Vor einiger Zeit schaltete ein Mitarbeiter bei Amazon Web Services einige Server aus,
die jedoch hätten eingeschaltet bleiben sollen. Der resultierende Systemausfall der Zone
US-East hatte ihren Ursprung in einem einzigen falsch eingegebenen Zahlenwert in
einer Konfigurationsdatei. Die Konfigurationsdatei definierte die Anzahl der Server die
angeschaltet waren. Die änderung war beabsichtigt, aber die Anzahl der abgeschal-
teten Server war zu hoch. Wir haben diesen Vorfall von Fehlern in automatisierten
Umgebungen genommen und haben das Konzept auf Continuous Deployment Pipelines
angewandt. Continuous Deployment Pipelines sind der nächste Schritt in der Evolution
von Continuous Pipelines. Die Amazon Cloud ist eine hochautomatisiertes Umgebung.
Pipelines sind ähnlich wie die Amazon Cloud ein ebenfalls hoch automatisiertes Umfeld.
Selbst kleine Fehler einen katastrophalen Ausgang nehmen können. Wir haben zwei
Experten in unterschiedlich großen Firmen interviewt. Beide Experten arbeiten mit den
evolutionären Vorgängern von Continuous Deployment Pipelines, nämlich Continuous
Integration und Continuous Delivery Pipelines. Basierend auf den Informationen, die
uns die beiden beide Experten über den aktuellen Stand von Continuous Pipelines
gaben, habe wir Einflussfaktoren abgeleitet die problematisch im Umfeld von Continu-
ous Deployment Pipelines sind. Probleme, die in momentan existierenden Continuous
Delivery Pipelines heute noch eine untergeordnete Rolle spiele, werden jedoch bei
hochautomatisierten Continuous Deployment Pipelines problematischer. Die entdeckten
Einflussfaktoren sind Probleme die bereits in momentan existierenden Continuous In-
tegration/Delivery Pipelines existieren, in welchen sie jedoch nur eine untergeordnete
Rolle spielen. Die erhöhte Automatisierung in Continuos Deployment Pipelines machen
diese Einflussfaktoren problematischer. Wir haben sowohl Klassifikationsmöglichkeiten
als auch Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten für jeden der entdeckten Einflussfaktor entwickelt.
Diese Methoden können zur Stabilisierung von Pipelines genutzt werden, um sie gegen
unbeabsichtigte Konfigurationsänderungen zu schützen.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Since Fowler’s popular article about continuous integration [FF06] further advance-
ments of automatically integrating software have been made [SBZ17]. Continuous build
pipelines are resulting in a higher IT performance and are reducing the pain of the
deployment process [Fos+17]. A continuous build pipeline should therefore be part of
every software project. Build pipelines are continuously evolving toll chain which can
now also do automated deployment to production [SDG+16]. The new techniques im-
proved the speed of software development but they also pose new challenges [LMP+15]
like being more error prone to configuration mistakes. Since the entire deployment step
is automated with continuous deployment pipelines [SBZ17], it is easy to shutdown
or change the live environment by just changing a few values in the configuration of a
pipeline. We have seen in other highly automated environments, such as the Amazon
cloud, that small unintended configuration changes can result in catastrophic outcomes
like the outage of an entire Availability zone [AWS17].
The problem of faulty configuration values from human interfaces is an accepted existing
problem [Woo04]. It is however not yet perceived as a common problem in build
pipelines. The reason for this is that most pipelines are not continuous deployment
pipelines. This is partially because it is not purposeful to implement a continuous
deployment pipeline in projects where the production environment is not a ubiquity
(e.g., firmware for hardware) [SBZ17]. The pitfalls of continuous deployment pipelines
are therefore still subject to research. We inspected two pipelines that are at the current
state of continuous integration and continuous delivery pipelines. In our research
we formulated a number of potential influence factors that could potentially alter the
behavior of pipelines by unintentionally changing the configuration of a pipeline. We
used information as well as approaches from other environments that are already
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engaging the problem of faulty inputs and unintended configuration changes in software
to apply them on continuous deployment pipelines (e.g., Conferr [KUC08]). We then
interviewed two experts in different companies that work on a regular basis with
continuous integration/delivery pipelines. The experts were interviewed to verify or
disprove the suspected influence factors.
We used the gathered information about the current state of the art in build pipelines to
derive identified influence factors that are potential threats in continuous deployment
pipelines.
For each of the identified influence factors we built a classification system to specify
whether a custom pipeline is exposed to the identified influence factor.We also proposed
a number of possible enhancements that can be implemented to harden a pipeline and
potentially prevent unintended configuration changes in the improved build pipeline.
In our evaluation we present the results to a third party expert that is also working with
build pipelines on a regular basis. He verified the results of the case study regarding
validity in his current project.
1.2 Research Goal and Questions
The first goal of this thesis is to verify whether the existence of unintended configuration
changes poses a threat to continuous deployment pipelines. In other words, "are
there unintended configuration changes in build pipelines?". We also investigated the
frequency of such configuration changes. Do these configuration changes effect on the
development or production environment. In our case study we used the following three
questions to analyze how to improve pipelines in the future in order to avoid unintended
configuration changes.
RQ.1 What are influence factors that can potentially result in unintended configuration
changes?
RQ.2 How to know if a specific pipeline is affected by an influence factor?
RQ.3 How would a solution to the discovered influence factors look like to strengthen a
pipeline against unintended configuration changes?
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured as follows.
2
1.3 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 - Foundations and Related Work This chapter gives an overview about
fundamentals of the definition of unintended configuration changes, the state of the art
in build pipelines, and how other environments already deal with similar problems.
Chapter 3 - Case Study Based on the research prior to this chapter we discovered
a set of possible factors that can potentially influence the behavior of pipelines in an
unintended way. Following up on the suspected influence factors is a case study which
is the main part of this thesis. We designed and conducted interviews in two different
companies. Guiding through the interview are the suspected influence factors which we
try to confirm or disprove throughout the interviews.
Chapter 4 - Influences and Classification We took the gathered data from both
interviews in the conducted case study to identified which of the potential influence
factors in fact pose a risk on continuous deployment pipelines. The identified influence
factors are identified based on the findings in the case study in Chapter 3. We also
validated the case study and its results based on validity concerns that are associated
with case studies. The chapter ends with the development of a classification system for
the identified influence factors. Based on this classification system, each custom pipeline
can be evaluated whether it is potentially affected by one of the influence factors.
Chapter 5 - Improving Continuous Pipelines We propose improvements for pipelines
so that each of the discovered influence factors may prevented. Some of these improve-
ments are organizational structure while others are just methods or implemented tools
that can be downloaded and plugged into the pipeline. All improvement approaches
strive for hardening a pipeline against the corresponding identified influence factor.
Chapter 6 - Evaluation This chapter concludes the thesis. We interviewed an expert
about our results and the effectiveness from his point of view. The expert is independent
from the first two experts that we interviewed. We also discussed the overall result of
this thesis and what we would like to see in future work about unintended configuration
changes in continuous deployment pipelines.
3

Chapter 2
Foundations and Related Work
Part of the software development process is the usage of other software tools [Wol16].
To cope with increased size and different requirements of today’s large-scale software
projects development processes have been continuously improved. Developing software
today is a streamlined process that is widely established by using software engineering
techniques like continuous integration [SBZ17].
This chapter will give a comprehensive overview of techniques and tools that are part of
modern deployment pipelines. The foundational basis provided in this chapter provides
the motivation on which the thesis is built. We present two outages that occurred in large
automated systems to demonstrate the risks posed by modern software systems. Next
we present a definition of unintended configuration changes as well as the state of the
art of continuous pipeline techniques and their components. The section about pipeline
editors shows collected information about people who commonly change the behavior
of a pipeline. In the context of deployment pipeline editors, the closely emerging term
’DevOps’ [ZBC16] [SDG+16] will be described. Finally, we investigate related tools and
techniques that cover unintended changes in pipelines, tools and approaches in other
environments.
2.1 Motivation
Errors in a software system can have catastrophic outcomes for the affiliated company
and are therefore worth preventing. This thesis is about the detection of configuration
changes in a deployment pipeline that were not desired by the maintainers of the
pipeline. An outage that occurs, no matter the cause, can have multiple consequences.
Users of the service are usually really upset about the unavailability of the service (e.g.
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1). What follows is not just fixing the problem but also a public statement why the
service was not working properly. The following subsections are going to summarize
some large outages were the root cause was connected to an unintended configuration
change in a large automated system. We use these examples to show what unintended
configuration changes in large automated systems can cause. We further investigate if
such configuration changes are applicable to deployment pipelines which are similarly
large automated environments. We investigate the question if similar errors and outages
are reasonably caused by deployment pipelines and how they do occur.
2.1.1 Amazon Web Services (AWS)
Amazon Web Services (AWS) is a secure cloud services platform, offering compute power,
database storage, content delivery and other functionality [AWS18]. On 28.02.2017
an outage on AWS US east occurred. While trying to improve a slow system, a small
number of servers should be taken offline by a trained member of a maintenance team.
The selected person of the debugging team closely followed the recommended procedure
for this. Unfortunately, he inserted a wrong value that defined how many servers should
be shut down. This resulted in the outage of availability zone ’US East N. Virginia’ from
9.37 AM to 1.18 PM [AWS17].
The exact severity of such an outage is hard to estimate. Many factors like perception of
users are hard to measure. The measurable aspect that is minimal consequence of this
outage is the Service Level Agreement (SLA) violation by AWS. AWS advertises their
cloud storage with availability zones that range from fault tolerant (less than 45 minutes
outages per month) to high availability (less than 5 minutes outage per month). This
outage lasted 3 hours and 41 minutes and therefore violates the SLA agreement with
every contractor in this zone. Depending on the rented service and the belonging SLA,
the next billing cycle gets reduced by 10%, 30% [AWS16a], or even 100% [AWS16b].
The exact severity of such an outages is hard to measure, but it is obvious that such
outages results in significant losses.
2.1.2 Facebook
Facebook is a social network which connects users by allowing them to share content like
texts, pictures and videos. On 23.09.2010 a large outage happened. The public apology
tried to explain what happened. The fallback configuration value that was stored in a
1https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/more-details-on-
todaysoutage/431441338919
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database was changed. A system for validating configuration values that is used in each
client signaled an error on the new value. The result was that all clients made a call to a
database which resulted in a feedback loop. The database was not meant to handle such
large numbers of requests and had to be restarted. As a result Facebook’s website was
not accessible for two and a half hours [Joh10].
This shows how catastrophic small changes in such automated environments can be. A
small changed value that was faulty and probably not connected to most of Facebooks
infrastructure caused catastrophic damage. More interestingly is that the outage was
caused by a system that should help to identify incorrect configuration values. It
therefore seems obvious that Facebook anticipates problems with faulty configuration
values or had problems with this in the past. This is however just speculation since such
problems are usually kept a secret to prevent bad publicity and are only made public if
an explanation is needed for an outage that was visible to the common user. Besides
damage done to the public opinion (the comments below the apology paint a clear
picture) there was most likely a financial drawback. The cost on how much money was
lost was not made public and can therefore only be estimated. At the time, Facebook
had roughly 500 million users [Sta17b] and the global revenue in the relevant quarter
was 467 Million U.S. dollars [Sta17a]. The outage occurred at 11.30 a.m. PST [ODe10]
(7.30 p.m. UTC) and took between 2.5 hours [Joh10] and 3.5 hours [ODe10] to resolve.
It is clearly visible that the outage occurred during the day when a lot of users where
online and tried to use Facebook. In this estimation it is assumed that every hour results
in the same amount of revenue for Facebook. This is clearly not an exact representation
since there are clearly less people using Facebook at 05.00 a.m. than at 11.00 a.m. As
a result, the calculated revenue loss is probably lower than the real value. The hereby
estimated loss was calculated with the formula shown below. The formula calculates to
a lost revenue of roughly 0.63 million U.S. dollars.
QuarterRevenue
QuarterDays ∗HoursPerDay = RevenuePerHour
2.2 Unintended Configuration Changes
This thesis is about the detection of unintended configuration changes in continuous
deployment pipelines. A pipeline that is set up once has a specific purpose of delivering
or deploying software.
Pipelines can and have to be changed during their lifetime. The result being that
changes to the configuration of a pipeline sometimes are resulting in an undesired
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behavior of the pipeline. The pipeline is not behaving in accordance to the needs of the
pipeline user. Transitioning from desired to undesired behavior, by modifying the
software of a pipeline, is called an unintended configuration change.
Detecting these unintended configuration changes is the first step in reverting, preventing
or undoing changes so that the behavior of a pipeline matches the needs of the users of
the pipeline.
2.3 Continuous Software Engineering Techniques
Continuous software engineering techniques are state of the art in developing software
[FF06]. Depending on how much automation is used in the development process is,
the continuous technique is named differently. Each of today’s existing techniques are
extending the previous one (See Figure 2.1). The three existing techniques are called
continuous integration, continuous delivery and continuous deployment. All these three
existing techniques are explained in the following Sections.
2.3.1 Continuous Integration
Continuous integration (CI) is the process of frequently compiling a new build (at least
once per day), based on the latest code commit of every developer [Lei17a]. The benefit
being that there is no merging of different parts before the release of a project. Before
CI was an established software development technique, the last step before deploying
a project was the integration. Integrating software was hard to estimate since it was
unknown how many new bugs would appear by merging different code packages[FF06].
CI constantly merges changes fully automated into a new build on a build server and
runs all available automated test cases. As a result, each bug directly appears as a
failed build and can be fixed while the code is still in fresh memory of the developer.
An additional benefit is that the build server is a fresh machine. If the last build was
working on a build server, it will most likely work on client machines and make the final
integration a non-event [FF06]. CI therefore works also as a anti pattern to a problem
that was quite common during software development. In some projects the code and
build would only work on developer machines and not in neutral environments [Lei17a].
In a CI environment bugs and faulty behaviors like this would be discovered within
minutes after the commit of such faulty code.
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2.3.2 Continuous Delivery
Continuous delivery can be seen as an extension to CI. Enhancing the CI pipeline to
always be able to deliver the current build to the client [SBZ17]. This requires not just
unit tests but also being able run in a production like environment. The result of a
continuous delivery pipeline should therefore be an image that can then be manually
copied to the production environment [SBZ17].
2.3.3 Continuous Deployment
Continuous deployment (CD) contains the most automated steps in the continuous
software development process [SBZ17]. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 describe how this
definition can be broken down into different levels of automation. What differentiates CD
from continuous delivery is the automatic deployment into the production environment
[SBZ17]. The final build that is generated by a continuous deployment pipeline is
automatically published and can be used by the clients that are using the product
[Che15].
Automation generally reduces bugs\time and as a result the cost of development [Che15].
However companies may decide not to automate every single step in a development
process. Sometimes, tests are expensive (e.g., long-term hardware resilience) or not pos-
sible to fully automate (e.g., user acceptance tests, exploratory tests [MSB17] [Wol16]).
The core of CD remains CI that can be set up in every development process (even
one man projects) to ensure that future growth of the project will kept the now state
of the art continuous deployment technique. Converting old projects and long living
noncontinuous pipelines to CD pipelines is costly [FF06]. The benefits are clear but as of
now there is no single tool that can be set up. Usually, multiple tools need to be plugged
in similar to Lego blocks to build a complete CD environment. CD tool representatives
that are part of a modern CD pipeline and that are popping up most commonly are
Jenkins, Docker, Github, Subversion, Microsoft Azure and AWS [BHR+15]. A hierarchic
representation of continuous techniques can be seen in Figure 2.1
2.4 State of the Art Pipelines
State of the art software development infrastructures mostly contains at least a continu-
ous integration pipeline [FF06]. As described in Section 2.3, continuous pipelines have
started with continuous integration [FF06] and have progressed since then. Not just
integrating but also being able to always deliver or even always deploy to production
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Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of including continuous techniques
[SBZ17]. These now further automated environments significantly reduced the cost of
the deployment of software that stood at the end of each release cycle [Che15].
Since complete deployment pipelines are a quite young technique and not yet well
established the challenges that are rising are not completely known. There is circum-
stantial proof that large companies that adopted continuous deployment already have
prevention techniques that cope with configuration changes in deployment pipelines
[Joh10] but there was no literature found that directly deals with the topic of unintended
configuration change detection in pipelines. However, both of the problems described
in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 indicate that pipelines in large organizations deal with this
problem and it is therefore worth investigating. Continuous deployment is a extension
of continuous integration\continuous delivery[SBZ17], we describe the different tech-
niques to later on understand what the differences are between the influences that we
found in continuous integration\delivery and continuous deployment. The differences
are important because they have to be considered when drawing conclusions about
continuous deployment.
2.4.1 Manual Deployment
Manual deployment is not a defined term. It is merely the sequence of steps that a
developer has to take to change his written code into an executable product for the
user. Since the beginning of software development this process was done manually
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by developers. This manual process was very prone to errors [SDG+16; Wol16] and
was quite costly [Che15]. In the early days of the 21st century, continuous integration
was proposed as an alternative to manual deployment [FF06]. Since then, continuous
deployment techniques have become an imperative in developing software. It has been
adopted by global players like Netflix, Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft and many
more. High frequency of change is a common practice which is almost impossible to
achieve while working with a manual deployment [Ber14a; FFB13]. Since manual
deployment is not longer the state of the art in developing software, its flaws and
benefits will not be part of this thesis.
2.4.2 Continuous Deployment Pipelines
Using CI in a project is powerful but would be a huge task if it would be done manually
after every commit. Global web-based service providers like Netflix, Amazon, and
Facebook produce new builds of parts of the entire system every day [Ber14a; FFB13;
GRH15b]. The automation in a CI environment is therefore mandatory. Most commonly,
Jenkins is used [Wol16] to realize the core of such an environment. Environments
where the deployed image is running (e.g., Amazon Web Services) and source code
management (SCM) systems (e.g., Git) are also part of a CI/CD Pipeline. Since Jenkins
is the widest spread tool it will also be focus in this thesis. Nonetheless, it is important to
note that there are useful alternatives. CruiseControl and Travis CI are two CI viable tools
that pose an alternative [Han16]. They both bring their own benefits and drawbacks
. Instead of Git, Subversion is a useful SCM [Ott09] tool and Azure is an alternative
platform to AWS [Col17].
The idea of Pipelines is to organize and automate different tasks that need to be
executed to create a new build version. These tasks get streamlined so that each
task is automatically performed in a sequenced work flow. Most tasks start with a
simple checkout from the SCM and could contain anything from compiling, starting new
instances of a docker container, a container which is light weight version of linux that
improves the portability of applications [Mer14]. The task then continuous by running
unit tests or finishing the pipeline with the final deployment of the newly build image.
Jenkins uses plug-ins to realize the extendability of its pipeline to the user. The control
flow can be defined by using a Jenkins file, a file in which the commands for Jenkins are
defined [Sma11], to set any number of steps in an CI/CD process [Jen17].
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Continuous Deployment Pipelines - Common description in Literature
Deployment pipelines are not always the same. They have a standardized skeleton of
tools that are used but the final setup looks always different. They emerge from the
process of transitioning towards a continuous deployment environment. As a result,
each pipeline is built by a set of different tools [URS+17].
Nonetheless, the structure of such a pipeline is often very similar. The general structure
of continuous delivery and continuous deployment pipelines is shown in Figure 2.2.
It shows four basic stages that every pipeline has. The first stage is a commit that is
done to a Source Control Management system (SCM). If a change is made the CI server
produces a new application image based on the newest code that is currently stored
in the SCM. The frequency of a new build can be customized, but it is recommended
that a new build is compiled at least once per day [Lei17a]. The new image then runs
through existing tests to ensure that the new code base is working properly. The final
step is the deployment of the new build to production [Che15; GRH15b; LSKM15;
SBZ17; URS+17]. The difference that each of the examined pipelines seems to have is
the testing step. Continuous delivery pipelines are not completely automated [SBZ17]
and can therefore contain manual testing. This is one of the reasons why not every
company transitioned towards a completely automated deployment pipeline [LMP+15].
Legacy code, user acceptance, exploratory, and similar tests are hard to automate and
are therefore still being done manually. It is possible to try and further automate these
by implementing A/B tests that are implicitly done by users [You16]. It however is
not possible for every environment to fully automate the pipeline and will therefore
probably never be a complete continuous deployment pipeline. Pipelines also have a
different amount of tests set up at different stages of the pipeline (e.g., performance
tests). This is useful since automation requires a large amount of testing [GRH15a].
These tests are however not displayed in Figure 2.2 because only a rough generalization
is displayed. A common pipeline almost always gets triggered with the commit of a
developer. The commit will then be used to create a new build that contains the old
code and the last commit. If the building of the new image is complete it will be tested.
If all tests are successful, the new image will be published to the client(s). The time
line of these steps varies for each pipeline between just five minutes and possibly years
[LMP+15]. Leppänen et al. [LMP+15] states that experienced users that build/use
deployment pipelines have mentioned that the higher the automation the lower the time
to release a new build to the client(s).
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Figure 2.2: General structure of continuous deployment pipelines according to [Che15;
GRH15b; LSKM15; SBZ17; URS+17]
2.4.3 Pipeline Components
This section shows what tools are commonly used in a deployment pipeline. Listing
specific technologies would probably be a never ending task. Shahin, Babar, and Zhu
[SBZ17] summarized amongst other things the tools that were found in their examined
environments and can be looked at if specific technology is considered to be used
somewhere. The enumeration that Shahin, Babar, and Zhu [SBZ17] made includes
not only core functionality but extensions that may or may not be considered useful
depending on the product. This difference of possible tool sets was already mentioned in
Section 2.4.2. Pipelines are not a defined set of tools but an individual set of components
that differ for each organization or even for different software products. Some core
tools and their functionality that are mandatory in all deployment pipelines are listed
below:
Source Control Management
By today’s standards almost every organization should use a source control management
(SCM) system. Most sources researching or discussing deployment pipelines were
implicitly assuming, that a SCM is used [Che15; FFB13; SBZ17; Spi05]. It is suggested
that an SCM is used even in sample projects to ensure a restorable history. Other benefits
are that everybody involved in a project is working on the same code base and developers
in large projects do not step on each others toes that much [Spi05]. As a result, a SCM
reduces the integration time on developer machines. The most commonly used SCMs
used in deployment pipelines are Git and Subversion [Ott09; SBZ17]. As a side note
Spinellis [Spi05] states that before SCMs became a standard, the transitioning towards
an environment that uses a SCM system required the building of a culture that embraces
this new technology. The transitioning from no SCM to using SCMs by default has
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quite a few similarities to the transitioning from a normal to a continuous development
practice.
Continuous Integration Server
Section 2.3.1 already described CI. Building a CI pipeline requires tools. In Fowler’s
article from 2006, he suggests to use CruiseControl [FF06]. This however seems to
be a tool that had already reached its peak and is no longer a recommended tool to
use [Han16]. Whether Git or Subersion is the most dominating tool does not seem to
be clear. Most sources suggest [Wol16] [Ace17] [SBZ17] that Jenkins has gained the
most attention because of its large community, open source license, and availability
of plug-ins. Other scientific works from the past three years that have amongst other
things worked with CI servers always mention Jenkins as their example [URS+17]
[GRH15b] [BHR+15]. This leads to the subjective perception that Jenkins actually is
the most commonly used CI server that exists today. A study investigating continuous
integration in open-source projects however discovered that Travis is the service that is
overwhelmingly used [HTH+16]. This deviation from the general opinion that Jenkins
is the largest representative for CI tooling can have multiple reasons. It is possible that,
for example, the time needed for projects to switch towards a different possibly better
technology is longer than the time that has passed since Jenkins showed up. Another
reason could be that Jenkins is open source while Travis sometimes has a monthly cost
between 69 USD and 489 USD [Tra18] which may disqualify it from being popular
amongst researchers. When building or talking about a CI pipeline, the tool, that is used
or should be considered to build such a pipeline, is most likely Jenkins. It has the most
support amongst researchers and is the perceived state of the art when it comes to CI
tools.
Testing
No matter what kind of continuous practice have been adopted (integration, delivery, or
deployment) the automation of tests is highly recommended [FF06]. This is because
the side effect of automation is that less humans oversee the resulting code image
which makes it easier for mistakes to slip through. Automated tests are mostly unit
test that ensure that code that was written and has responsible unit test(s) is working
correctly. Reality shows that nowadays acceptance [GRH15a] and exploratory [Wol16]
[LMP+15] tests are still done by human beings that are part of the development team.
Automating these kinds of tests has, for most companies, not been adopted yet. As
long as these tests show results companies do not consider to think about transitioning
towards a more continuous model [LMP+15]. It is possible to automate for example
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user acceptance tests by realizing an automated A/B deployment model [KDWH16].
This automation lets users make decisions (mostly without their knowledge) on the
advantage and disadvantages of new features and designs. The implicit outsourcing of
quality assurance to customers is the recommended way when in comes to continuous
practices because it can be automated but it may come at a cost. As a downside,
resources drawn from customers are quite significant and since continuous deployment
is largely adapted by web companies the public opinion can suffer from such a practice.
An example where outsourcing the QA team was publicly tried is the youtube.com heroes
program [You16] that was negatively perceived by customers for the extra effort that
they would have to put in for testing unfinished features.
Deployment Server
A deployment server is nowadays usually build using an external machine in which only
a limited amount of people should have access. The deployment server ensures that
code that a developer built on his machine is also working on any other machine. The
deployment server should therefore not be configurable by the developers [Lei17a].
Further functionality
The above described pipeline components are building the skeleton of most pipelines.
Section 2.3.3 already mentioned that no pipelines, aside from the skeleton, are the
same. Enhancing pipelines to fit the need of an application or organization is absolutely
reasonable and recommended. Possible enhancements that can be made are for example
adding additional testing tools/steps or performance monitors to further improve the
code quality of the product that uses the pipeline. Another interesting enhancement
that was found during research was a deployment management system [SDG+16].
According to Savor et al. [SDG+16] such a management system was built in-house at
both companies they investigated. It helped the operators in their task to release a new
build to the public. The exact functionality is however not further explained.
2.5 Pipeline Editors
This section aims to answer the question who has access to edit a pipeline, who commonly
changes the pipeline and who is maybe forced to do so. Similar to the project-specific
tool sets of pipelines as described in Section 2.3.3, the access rights are most likely
also project-specific. The listed sources describe who should have access to a pipeline
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according to literature and how the access rights are handled at the examined environ-
ment. The term DevOps that has gained increasing popularity in the last couple of years
[KDWH16] is also described because of its close relation to this topic.
2.5.1 DevOps
DevOps is one of these practices that is continuously becoming more common. According
to a study from 2017 more the 25% of the questioned people now work as a part of a
DevOps team [Fos+17]. The problem with DevOps is that it is a word that has a different
definition for everyone who describes DevOps. The term was coined at a conference
in Belgium in 2009 and is the combination of the words Development and Operations
[Wol16]. A scientific approach to describe DevOps has been tried in the past.
“DevOps is a development methodology aimed at bridging the gap between
Development (Dev) and Operations, emphasizing communication and collaboration,
continuous integration, quality assurance and delivery with automated deployment
utilizing a set of development practices.”[JAPT16]
According to this most general definition, the two departments development and op-
erations are now working closer together. The boundaries between developers and
operators become fuzzy. The assumption that both, development and operations, have
access to the same pipeline is not far fetched. The worst case thinkable is that an
operator if forced to change a pipeline that was exclusively built and maintained by
the development department. Nonetheless nobody that talks about DevOps will have
this general definition in mind. Because this general definition is not applicable to the
examined environments, the case study will determine how DevOps is implemented at
the examined environments.
2.5.2 Editors according to literature
Information about what tools to use in a pipeline is common knowledge in any scientific
work about deployment pipelines [KDWH16; SBZ17; Wol16]. The information who
should have access rights to a deployment pipeline are almost never mentioned. It is
possible that everyone writing about deployment pipelines acknowledges the different
structures of organizations and pipelines, and is therefore reluctant to propose a specific
setting of access rights. Multiple sources have mentioned that malicious intrusions are
concerns that exist [BHR+15; HF10; KDWH16]. None of these sources however discuss
how access rights should be assigned to different roles. That frustrated employees can
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manipulate the digital infrastructure is not far fetched. An example would be that a
twitter employee deleted a popular political account because he was disagreeing with
the contents that were posted there [Hea17]. This is a case where even subcontractors
had the same access rights as real employees and therefore the same permissions. When
talking about safety, Humble and Farley [HF10] revealed that some companies only
allow senior personnel to access the environment in which the compilation and assembly
happens. We are now assuming that these companies would now transition towards a
continuous deployment pipeline. The guideline about access only to senior personnel
for the final step would consist the logical result would be that the entire pipeline is only
accessed by senior personnel.
2.6 Related Work
Part of the research on this topic includes the state of the art in unintended change
prevention techniques. In other words how is the topic of this thesis already handled
in scientific approaches and real deployment pipelines. During our research we did
however find only a limited amount. A tool that evaluates errors of human interface
configuration was found and is described in Section 2.6.1. Additionally the outage at
Facebook that is described in Section 2.1.2 mentions that a configuration validation tool
is in use [Joh10]. Facebook however is not willing to share such internal processes and
the outage message is a rare peak of the internal work flow.
That (unintended) change detection in deployment pipelines is not handled on a higher
level could have different reasons. It would be conceivable that since deployment
pipelines are still a young technique that is not that well established yet what the
downside of this new technique is. Another reason might be that since pipelines are
custom build that validation must also be self-build to satisfy the need of the project in
which a pipeline is used. We point out that the tools and methods, that are described
in the following, are just a related topic to this thesis. They do not explicitly engage
unintended configuration changes in continuous deployment pipelines. We show not
just tools and techniques that we researched prior to the thesis, but also additional
important tools and techniques that we discovered during the writing of this thesis.
2.6.1 ConfErr
While researching human interface related outages, a tool named ConfErr was found
[KUC08]. The paper that describes the tool describes why the tool is important, for what
it can be used and the effectiveness of the implementation. To justify the realization of
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such a tool the problem that human interaction causes errors in software configuration
is shown. According to Keller, Upadhyaya, and Candea [KUC08] approximately 30% of
software failures are caused by human errors. It is further mentioned that approximately
50% of human related errors are based on the configuration. These error rates exist in ei-
ther simple Internet services for regular human beings as well as high risk environments
such as nuclear reactors. Considering that people that are involved with such configura-
tions range from inexperienced to well trained would suggest that errors made to an
interface are a human problem that shows up independent from the environment. This
would lead to the assumption that similar numbers can be estimated for configuration
errors made to pipelines. The tool that is described takes configuration files of software
and manipulates them. This happens based on different mistakes that were identified
as possible outcomes of distracted, inattentive, unexperienced or untrained humans.
The manipulated files are then inserted instead of the original files. The tool then tests
the faulty configuration files in startup and functional tests for the specific software. As
an output reports are generated that show how resilient the given software is to the
inserted faulty configuration files. According to the paper the tool was build to enhance
testing in the development process since human interface safety is not considered a
worthy test candidate.
This thesis however focuses on the unintended detection of pipeline changes. Assessing
the resilience of interfaces would therefore be a helpful tool to prevent unintended
changes. Tools that are often used in pipelines (e.g., Jenkins) cloud be evaluated on their
weaknesses in human interfaces. This weaknesses would then influence the evaluation of
the later developed classification. This however would require access to the alleged open
accessible source code that can be found 2. Access to the source code and documentation
has been repeatedly requested. The inclusion of ConfErr will therefore depend on the
availability of source code or binary [KUC08].
2.6.2 JobConfigHistory
Much like ConfErr this tool is not directly build for change detection in deployment
pipelines. The tool however implicitly states with its existence that getting an overview
of the configuration and history of a pipeline is functionality that is demanded. The fact
that it is used in literature [Wol16] and the number of downloads [BFF+18] show the
real applicability. JobConfigHistory is a Jenkins plug-in that is available in the Jenkins
plug-in market place or through the Jenkins wiki page 3 . This plug-in permanently stores
each old Jenkins configuration file. Is the currently active configuration file changed
2http://conferr.epfl.ch/
3https://wiki.jenkins.io/display/JENKINS/JobConfigHistory+Plugin
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the plug-in collects the now outdated and saves it. Should a rollback be required it is
possible to simply select a older configuration file and restore it. It is also possible to
compare two configuration files and visualize the difference that exists between those
two. The visualization is done similarly to the solving of merge conflicts in SCMs. The
simplicity and easy access result in a useful enhancement of a pipeline. However good
the enhancement is, without modification it is a plug-in that helps recovering and not
detecting changes in a deployment pipeline.
2.6.3 Infrastructure as Code
The idea behind infrastructure as code is that the configuration of a service is now
done by coded commands. This idea was most likely founded by Mark Burgess with his
program CFEngine in the early 1990’s [Joh17]. With the rising of DevOps practices the
concept gained increasing popularity [Mor17]. Because configuring a service is now
done by code inside a file, it is now possible to apply "normal" software development
techniques. It is possible to store those configuration files inside an SCM, do automatic
tests to a configuration and let machines and services now be automatically configured
[Mor17]. Tools that are commonly used to realize infrastructure as code are for example
Puppet and Chef [KDWH16]. The benefits of having Infrastructure as Code are obvious.
Creating a new service with the same configuration as currently used is now a trivial
task. Human error is eliminated by executing an automated task reliable and repetitive
if necessary. With the increasing popularity of cloud computing such configuration tasks
have to be done more frequent and the invested time into configuring a virtual machine
significantly decreases by using infrastructure as code [Mor17].
2.6.4 Canary Analysis
Canary analysis is similar to A/B testing, a method in which two instances of the same
(Canary Analysis)/similar(A/B testing) software are accessible by clients/customers.
However, the aim in Canary analysis are not the users. The target is a newly deployed
service. Canary analysis tries to detect problems with a newly deployed version that was
not existing in the old one [Mar15a]. The canary release process is not replacing old
software in a cloud environment. Instead a new cluster is started. Small amounts of
production traffic are distributed towards the newly deployed software on the so called
’canary’. In case of errors or performance issues of the new system a rollback is easy
to do [Blo18]. The old version of the software is still running and handles most of the
production traffic anyways. A cooperation between Google and Netflix published an
open source automated version of this canary analysis release process. The software was
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Figure 2.3: Basic Canary Release Process
published on the 2018-05-10, is called Kayenta and can be found in Github 4. The visual
representation of how canary analysis is supposed to work can be seen in 2.3.
2.7 Foundational conclusion
This chapter shows basic information about the topic of this thesis. Key questions like
what technologies are used to build a pipeline, who configures the behavior and what
are existing change prevention techniques have been answered. The answers to these
questions function as a solid foundation on the continuing thesis. It also shows that
continuous deployment pipelines are the fastest and most beneficial way to deploy
software to a production environment.
A problem however is that continuous deployment is seen with reluctance since the final
image is not overlooked by testers before it is deployed to production. The fear that errors
are showing up in production is not neglectable. To ensure that continuous deployment
works as intended, automated tests are required to be executed before every deploy.
Since automated tests are also part of continuous delivery and continuous integration
(the continuous techniques are part of continuous deployment), the abstinence of
automated testing in continuous deployment is not considered to be the biggest problem.
Each predecessor already contains automated tests.
A problem that is however rising up with continuous deployment is the correct function-
ality of the deployment pipeline. If a pipeline is not working correctly in continuous
integration or continuous delivery the result of an faulty image is not considered to be a
big problem. This is because before deploying an image to production is overlooked by
humans. Ann error that originates from a faulty delivery process would be picked up. In
a continuous deployment pipeline however, errors that originate from the deployment
4https://github.com/spinnaker/kayenta
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process would not be picked up until they show up in production. It is therefore worth to
detect unintended configuration changes in continuous deployment pipelines to prevent
errors (e.g., a changed load threshold that should have been tested for) that originates
from the now fast deployment method of continuously deploying software.
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Chapter 3
Case Study
3.1 Case study Introduction
We conducted case studies in two companies that operate in different industry sectors.
Both companies operate on an international level and employ more than 10000 employ-
ees. One of which already made the transition to a delivery pipeline based deployment.
The other company is still in between continuous integration and continuous delivery.
These case studies are the core knowledge source for the current state of the art of
pipelines and how certain principles that are proposed by the literature (e.g., DevOps)
are implemented.
The main goal of these case studies is to verify or refute influences that can change
the behavior of a deployment pipeline in an unintended way. In context of suspected
influence factors (see Section 3.4), new or potential known factors may be discovered.
The fact that two companies with different pipelines are observed is also beneficial.
While company Alpha employs hundreds of software developers company Beta only
employs approximately twenty people that deal with software development. From these
people only one is responsible for the pipeline. This contrast can help to identify what
internal structures and settings which are beneficial for a deployment pipeline.
3.2 Designing the Case Study
To ensure that the case study is of high quality, we designed this case study based on the
approach of Runeson and Höst [RH08]. The case study was then adjusted by including
the guidelines from Baxter and Jack [BJ08]. Runeson and Höst [RH08] provide step
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by step explanations for the design, execution, and interpretation of a case study. The
structure of the case study follows these steps closely.
3.2.1 Defining the Case
Runeson and Höst [RH08] defined six basic elements that should be part of each case
study. These six elements are displayed here.
• The objective of this case study is exploratory [BJ08]. The task of the case study is
the verification or disproving of the potential influence factors on the configuration
of deployment pipelines. Also discovering additional influence factors, that are not
yet known is part of the objective of this case study.
• The case that is the subject of this study is the detection of unintended configu-
ration changes in continuous deployment pipelines. The fact that delivery and
deployment pipelines are closely related (they are only differentiated by the final
deployment step Section 2.3) makes it possible to study either of them and draw
conclusions that apply to both.
• The theory on which the case study is based upon was stated in the motivation in
Chapter 2. The idea is that even a small misconfiguration in a large automated
environment can change its behavior. This way, it may be possibly to change
the corresponding environment which is seen by customers. Ultimately resulting
in undesired behavior that originates from unintended configuration change of
the deployment pipeline. Such configuration mistakes pose a threat to a service
provider that makes these mistakes worth detecting.
• The interview questions are written and justified in Section 3.4. Each of these
questions that should be answered in the case study serve a specific purpose of
verifying or disproving a suspected influence factor. A specific description why a
question is asked in the interview is explained below the question itself.
• The method that was chosen to conduct the case study is categorized as direct
(See. Runeson and Höst [RH08]). An interview with a maintainer/developer of a
pipeline was conducted to answer the research questions. An important subject
that is proposed by Runeson and Höst [RH08] is the triangulation to compensate
for statistical anomalies. For data triangulation more than one pipeline is looked
at. For observer triangulation, each interview of the pipeline that will be examined
will be conducted with a different maintainer/developer. Unfortunately using
different methodological approaches is not feasible. Indirect and independent
approaches could not be applied due to restrictions by the contributing companies.
24
3.2 Designing the Case Study
Lastly, using a different viewpoint is also not possible. The topic of this thesis is
exactly the viewpoint that is taken to conduct the case study.
• The selection strategy which pipelines to examine is partially set by the contribut-
ing companies. Company Beta only uses a similar set of pipelines in a single
development team. Company Alpha however has access to multiple different
pipelines because each development team builds its own pipeline. The observed
pipeline at company alpha is part of a project which tries to implement as many
agile development techniques as possible. When possible, the units of analysis are
defined as a comparison of standard pipelines. For the same reason, the previously
mentioned data triangulation is done. We preferred to get an overview of standard
pipelines where typical problems exist. Extreme cases that deviate extremely
from a typical pipeline are less helpful because a generalization on problems and
solutions is not reliable. Previously done research in Section 2.3 suggests that
implementations of pipelines are mostly different and therefore defining a "typical
pipeline" is hard.
3.2.2 Binding the Case
Baxter and Jack [BJ08] suggest that it is useful to clarify what is explicitly out of scope
of the case study. It is stated that this is a common pitfall that is associated with case
studies in general. The reason for unintended configuration changes are not limited
to software, only. Changes that are made to the underlying hardware layer may be
discovered as influence factors during the case study. It is however not the desired target
to collect and later on resolve such problems. Unoptimized organizational structure
is also out of scope whereas human errors are in scope. It is important to note that
unintended configuration change refers to the pipeline and not the software that is
processed by the pipeline. This thesis is about detecting undesired configurations of a
pipeline. The objective is to ensures that there are no additional bugs that are showing
up just because the pipeline was not correctly configured.
3.2.3 Protocol Intentions
The protocol covers all questions that are asked in the interview [RH08]. The interview
is designed to cover all topics that should be part of a case study. For each of the
examined pipelines the protocol has the same five main goals that are tracked. These
five main goals can be seen in Section 3.2.3.
The first goal is collecting background information about the interviewed partner. The
goal is not the knowledge-profit but the setting of a relaxed atmosphere for the relevant
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interview questions. The maintainer and the interviewer get to know the technological
understanding and current mindset of deployment pipelines and processes. Such an
interview introduction is done to match the chosen structured glass time model. The
glass time model was suggested by Runeson and Höst [RH08] and is explained in Section
3.5.
The second goal is to discover how much common ground there is between literature
and the examined pipeline. Are all the changes that are proposed by literature and
researchers a target that the company is aiming for? If not, then it would be possible
that live environments and researchers are heading in different directions that lead to
different problems. The idea for these questions originates from Section 2.4.3 where it
is explained that researchers are expecting Jenkins to be state of the art in integrating
continuously. The only survey related to this topic however said that Travis CI is used
in most environments. Researching about this topic leads to a number of suspected
influence factors that can change the behavior of a pipeline in an unintended way. In
the interview, each of those suspected influence factors will be investigated to see if they
actually influence the behavior of a deployment pipeline in an unintended way and if
they can potentially be harmful.
The fourth goal that is investigated is information that is originating from the investigated
company. How severe have outages been in the past and what do the developers/main-
tainers of the pipeline think about potential threats to changes of a deployment pipeline.
The idea is that according to Bertram [Ber14b] the developers of a service know the
service best. The best problem assessment and solution is therefore preferably produced
by a developer of the environment.
The last goal that is tracked by the set of questions is the discovery of existing prevention
techniques. In Section 2.6, we already mentioned that there are existing techniques that
are kept behind closed doors by cooperations that build those in house. The intention is
to see if solutions are also applied by a company that is less involved with IT. For each of
these goals, a number of questions is collected in Section 3.4. The section also explains
why a question was asked and what the knowledge-profit is that can be gained from the
question. A rough overview of the structure for the case study is displayed below.
• Background information about the interview expert
• Are proposals done by the literature a desired/implemented target (e.g., Continu-
ous Deployment, Security, technologie assumptions (Git, AWS, Jenkins))
• Verify or disprove suspected potential influence factors (e.g., Only-Humans, De-
vOps, change rate)
• Discover additional influence factors and outages
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• Discover implemented prevention techniques
3.3 Question Selection
Some of the following questions are a direct result from researching the topic of this
thesis. A example would be a slip (e.g., Character substitution [KUC08]) in a human
configuration interface. Other questions are introduced because it is reasonable that
such problems exist (e.g., a faulty DevOps implementation).
The research of Avizienis et al. [ALRL04] served as a starting point to identify potential
sources for errors in pipelines. To apply the research of Avizienis et al. [ALRL04],
pipelines are treated as regular software. Considering how pipelines are usually built
(described in Section 2.4) this comparison can be done without restraint. According
to this source, failures of software are undesired behaviors. The definition of this
thesis in Section 2.2 states that an unintended change results in an undesired behavior.
Unintended configuration changes in pipelines can be viewed as software failures since
the pipelines fails to result in the desired behavior. Failures are the result of errors that
are in turn caused by faults. The logical step to prevent an unintended configuration
change (failure) would be the prevention of the root cause, the fault.
Faults can originate from three different sources. These are development, physical and
interaction faults. These faults can be further specified in eight different elementary
fault classes. This hierarchy can be seen in Figure 3.1 [ALRL04]. We considered
the fact that physical faults are always related to hardware. We already discussed in
Section 3.2.2 that hardware faults are out of scope of this case study and therefore
not considered furthermore. The relevant dimension for our case study in which
unintended configuration changes could appear are always rooted in software. Other
threat possibilities are malicious intents, deliberate faults through harmful decision
making, and finally faults that are made either by accident or by incompetence. Malicious
intents always refer to a security problem which explains the questions that are about
security (e.g., Section 3.4.2). The problem of deliberately making a harmful decision
to the configuration of a pipeline is the next shown fault source. To solve this problem,
it would be required to prevent authenticated access of authorized developers. Since
there is always an access point to change a configuration, it is impossible to pose a
preventative solution to this problem. If there is an agreement for a bad decision it will
be implemented, no matter the technological enhancements. The remaining two fault
sources are accidental and incompetence. These show either during development of a
software (pipeline) or during operation of a pipeline. Both of these are considered a
major source of potential damage because they do not only fit the problems suggested by
research (e.g., slip according to Keller, Upadhyaya, and Candea [KUC08]) but they also
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Figure 3.1: Tree representation of fault classes according to Avizienis et al. [ALRL04]
match logical conclusions. Most of the questions that do not originate from researched
suggestions focus on these two fault sources.
An important detail in the used taxonomy is that all potential faults that are not physical
(hardware related) are always categorized as human made. The result is that human
beings are a common factor when talking about faults that are unintended configuration
changes. The question: ’How many times do unintended configuration changes originate
from humans/machines?’ tries to directly verify this suspicion. Depending on the
outcome, the human factor will be a significant factor when classifying and solving the
verified influence factors.
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3.4 Question Protocol
The following questions investigate our suspected influence factors that were asked to
the experts that develop or maintain a pipeline. Each expert at each company was asked
this block of questions. Below each question is a short explanation what the question
should achieve in finding an influence factor for the pipeline. These explanations are
only displayed in this thesis and have not be shown to the experts. Also, the suspicions
have not been shown to the experts because it would have transformed them into
suggestive questions undermining the validity of the study and its results.
3.4.1 Introduction and General Information
The primary focus is not the knowledge-profit but starting the interview on a relaxed
manner. The questions are easy to answer and not necessarily restricted to the questions
that are stated below. These questions are asked so that trust can be built between both
interview partners [RH08].
Introduction of the thesis, the interviewer and the interviewee
This part was added after the execution of the first case study at Company Beta. The
idea is to present the topic of this thesis to the interviewed expert. In addition of giving
the expert an idea what the thesis is about, both people that are part of the interview
gain a common ground of knowledge. Such a common ground is important because like
it was explained in Section 2.3 each pipeline and the resulting deployment process look
different.
How long has the expert been working with the pipeline?
A short amount of time could mean that importance and impact knowledge is missing.
As a result, decisions that are made because of the lack of knowledge can change the
pipeline in an undesired way.
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How did the expert encounter the pipeline for the first time?
A self thought individual that has only self thought knowledge is probably only in
possession of the knowledge of parts over the pipeline that are previously touched by
the individual. Changes on different parts of the pipeline are therefore most likely knew
and have a high potential to be faulty.
What kind of continuous pipeline is used for the deployment of software (Continuous -
Integration, Delivery or Deployment)
Most companies are not using a complete continuous deployment pipeline. This is either
because they are still building towards a more continuous development technique or
because the final steps of implementing a continuous deployment pipeline are considered
too dangerous [LMP+15]. This question should clarify where the examined pipelines are
currently at. This helps interpreting the data that has been gathered from this interview.
This is a question that was not in the original set of questions. It was added after the
first case study was executed.
How does the entire deployment process usually look like?
This question helps the expert/maintainer that is interviewed and the interviewer to get
some common ground. This is a question that was not in the original set of questions. It is
an extension that was made because it was a huge benefit to the case study at company
Beta. The question helped the interview partners to get to common ground on the
deployment process. Further questions could sometimes refer back to the overall process.
Getting some common ground in the context of deployment pipelines is especially useful
because all pipelines are custom build and look differently in even the same companies
like it was described in Section 2.3. Furthermore not just the pipelines but also the
deployment process is mostly different.
3.4.2 Implementation of Methods and Techniques Proposed by Literature
This first set of Questions is trying to discover how much literature approaches deviate
from real environments. The idea is to see what ideas that are proposed by the literature
are also implemented in reality. If there are certain ideas that are not being implemented
the result could be that there are different problems rising up. The result would be that
the suspected influence factors are probably deviating from the real influence factors.
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Git,AWS,Jenkins: Are these the used tools and services?
If there are other services used like for example a cloud service provider that has a low
availability [GR92] class (or servers in the "basement") that could mean that outages
occur from the unavailability of the hardware resources. Also, if there is a less commonly
used continuous integration server used that would mean that the implementation of
prevention techniques could be harder. A possible example would be plug-ins like the
presented JobConfigHistory in Section 2.6.2.
Is continuous deployment the desired target?
According to literature, a continuous deployment pipeline is the best solution for de-
ploying software [LMP+15; SDG+16] because increased automation reduces the time
between releases. During research, information indicates that some companies only
transition towards a delivery pipeline [LMP+15]. If this would be the case in the exam-
ined environment, that would mean that implemented solutions could work different
(slower/not immediately) since changes are not directly pushed to clients. The solutions
can therefore simpler or less reliable.
How serious is the security in a deployment pipeline taken?
Having an insecure password would make it easy for unauthorized personnel to change
the behavior of a pipeline. The literature proposes safe and different passwords for each
login [URS+17]. The idea that insufficient security can also unintentionally change the
behavior of a pipeline originates from Bass et al. [BHR+15] where it was discovered that
malicious attacks are a concern that companies have about their deployment pipelines.
Additionally, our experience shows that passwords are loosely handled, especially in
"protected" environments. The last time that we worked in a larger project the actual
name and password for the integration server was throughout the entire project "admin"
(Name) and "jenkins" (password). Important to mention is that the project was conducted
in a state of the art research facility.
DevOps - definiton, how and why is implementation a desired target?
It was already stated in subsection 2.5.1 that DevOps is just a vague definition to
somehow bridge the gap between the departments development and operations. The
interesting question is how the transition is working. Since it is not clearly defined what
DevOps is doing exactly, any number of dangerous scenarios are imaginable.
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3.4.3 Verification or Disproval of Suspected Influence Factors
This set of questions is probably the most important one. Entities that can potentially
be harmful to the configuration of a deployment pipeline have been identified through
research about this topic. Each of the discovered factors will be discussed with an expert
of a pipeline in the examined environment. This will help to identify threads to the
configuration of a deployment pipeline.
Are Slips while Inserting Considered a Threat?
Configuration interfaces do not vary from application to application in a significant
matter. Each application will have different settings but the concept generally stays the
same. Knowing this, it is obvious that numbers and approaches from other interfaces can
be taken into account. Yin et al. [YMZ+11] discovered that most faulty behaviors are
originating from incorrect configuration values and that the most common reason for a
misconfiguration is a slip (e.g., case alteration, typo) while inserting such values. Since
this is also the same reason that was the cause for one of the motivational examples that
was described in subsection 2.1.1, it is suspected that this is one of the most important
influence factors considering unintended changes in deployment pipelines.
DevOps - What are the remaining differences between development and operation and
how is each department trained?
DevOps was already mentioned in the last set of questions. It is also mentioned here
because it is suspected that a "bad" implementation could possibly mean that operations
and development now have access to the working environment of each other. As a
result, it is thinkable that a untrained operations employee is forced to alter a pipeline
with a lack of knowledge about it. The clear distinction between tasks that remain in
development and in operation is a useful information.
Who has access to a pipeline and its configuration?
This question is the continued train of thought from the previous question. Maybe it is
not just DevOps but possibly imaginable that other untrained personnel could possibly
access the pipeline and, since they are untrained, accidentally change the behavior of the
pipeline without any intention of doing so. Such personnel could include management
or an IT department. The unlikeliness of discovering a real threat here is considered
to be low but it is nonetheless a possibility. This question was clarified by renaming it
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from "Who has access to a Deployment Pipeline" to "Who has access to a Pipeline and its
Configuration" after the first case study was conducted.
How many different pipelines exist and what is the difference between those?
A conceivable problem is the change of a pipeline that looks much like another pipeline
but it is not the same except a single string (e.g., name of the pipeline). Such a problem
would maybe not be detected immediately. For example, the number of active servers
is changed for the wrong pipeline. This would then only be visible if the actual load
exceeds the number of possible load and the service becomes unavailable for users. The
reversed effect (e.g., a larger number is wrongfully inserted in the wrong pipeline) could
lead to a higher number of active servers that are not needed for a service. The pipeline
that should originally be changed would still carry the old value. The idea for this is
originated from personal experience that is humorously summarized in the following
tweet1:
puts your life into perspective when someone is shooting a car into space, you’re
spending an hour looking at a production site wondering why your local changes aren’t
being reflected
Sometimes human beings make simple mistakes without noticing that they are doing
something wrong. With the addition that a configuration change in a deployment
pipeline would not be reflected immediately anyway the mistake would then just stay in
there without being noticed.
Are there executing conditions in a pipeline?
This question is designed to discover if a pipeline has a "code coverage" of 100% or not.
If yes, that means that all misbehaviors that can be generated by a pipeline are inserted
during operation. If not, it is possible that the original pipeline contained errors that
are dormant until a certain functionality of a pipeline is accessed [ALRL04]. In this
case pipeline unit test to prove that a pipeline is working would be a possible solution
approach.
1https://twitter.com/iamdevloper/status/961230773658427392
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How many configuration interfaces impact the behavior of a pipeline?
Having a large amount of tools that contribute to the pipeline can have a dangerous
side effect of loosing the overview of the pipeline. Each additional tool brings its own
configuration interface which is then inevitably part of the pipeline. Much like a large
and old software product has sometimes code fragments of which the use is questionable,
to everyone working with the code, this is also a conceivable effect for a pipeline. This
knowledge distribution sometimes results in changes that should not be made because
there are dependencies on the previous setting [PSV01]. The result being that changes
to entities with dependencies may result in undesired behavior of the pipeline.
How many configuration values impact the behavior of a pipeline and how dangerous
are single values?
This question is similar to the previous question. A large number of values can also
lead to a lost overview of a pipeline [PSV01]. In addition, this question can provide
information to discover what potential dangerous impact single values can have on the
pipeline. If for example interface values are only a threat in combination with other
values, this has to be considered when choosing a prevention technique later on.
How often does a pipeline change?
The change frequency is suspected to be one of the major possible threats. If a pipeline
is set up once and never changed it is less likely to contain a configuration error then a
pipeline that is permanently changed. It is also important to notice that according to
Keller, Upadhyaya, and Candea [KUC08] using an interface over a longer time results
in tasks moving from high-level cognitive levels to low ones. Basically, over time the
same/similar task gets easier. If an interface is used multiple times, the mistakes made
with such an interface that are based on required knowledge go down and simple
mistakes like typos go up in their frequency of appearance. This means that the change
frequency has a direct correlation with the errors that are made with such an interface
[KUC08].
How much time is assigned to the task of changing the configuration of a pipeline?
If changing the pipeline configuration is not seen as a real task that has to be scheduled
but rather a thing that has to change "on the fly" it is more likely that a hasty change
contains mistakes (e.g., slips).
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How familiar is a pipeline maintainer to the tools that are used in the pipeline and how
often do the maintainers change?
This question is related to the previous one. If the maintainer of a pipeline is familiar with
the tool he then knows what the tool is doing and simple mistakes (e.g., substitutions,
case alterations) are more likely to be the dominant error source [KUC08]. The other
case would be that the maintainer does not know much about the used tools. In this
case it is more likely that changes to the pipeline are severe because the experience
gathered with the tool are by trial and error or a similar approach. The result of this
question could be that if a maintainer frequently changes, that different error prevention
techniques are promising effective results [KUC08].
How many people change a pipeline on a regular basis and how closely do they work
together?
If multiple people are maintaining a pipeline, it would be possible that unusual constructs
that stand on thin ice are easily changed by another authorized maintainer that does not
understand how the pipeline in its current form work. The number of people that work
together on a pipeline is therefore a potential influence factor.
How many times do unintended configuration changes originate from
humans/machines?
A hypothesis that came up during research is that configuration changes always have to
originate from human beings working with a pipeline [ALRL04]. A once set up pipeline
will always deliver the same result. A correctly configured pipeline is then only behaving
imperfectly if a unintended configuration was made. This has to come from a human
being. As a result, the most dangerous (or only) influence factor for unintended changes
in deployment pipelines would be human error.
How does testing the pipeline work?
Is testing specifically for a pipeline already done (e.g., unit tests for a deployment
pipeline). Since pipelines seem to evolve into custom software projects, this could be
an approach that could help prevent unintended changes. If not, how is the company
already ensuring a well functioning deployment process.
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3.4.4 Discovery of Additional Influence Factors, Outages and Priority
The following questions are designed to let the questioned maintainer talk more freely
about the topic of unintended configuration changes in his/her deployment pipeline.
This approach is taken because it is a similar one that is taken by Netflix.
"The developers know their service best" [Mar15b]
A maintainer of a pipeline may know where the weak spots are that can possibly bring
down the entire construction similar to a normal developer of a software product/service.
This helps with identifying influence factors that exist but were overlooked during
research. In addition to the personal views of the maintainer, this set of questions also
investigates outages that originally motivated this thesis. How severe and often do
outages related to pipeline configuration happen? Also how often is such an outage
visible to the public? In the motivational Section 2.1 it was suspected that pipeline-
related outages are not made public because it is an internal procedure that companies
do not share. Especially when the topic is about mistakes that were made. These
questions helps to verify or disprove this suspicion.
Do known outages exist in regard to unintended configuration changes in the
deployment pipeline?
Question to discover the potential impact of the discovered implemented prevention
techniques that this thesis engages. This helps to potentially justify the existence of
further research about this topic beyond this thesis.
How often are pipeline connected outages visible to clients of the environment
produced by the pipeline?
A hypothesis that was was made in Section 2.1 was that pipelines are an internal process
that companies are not willing to share. Especially in the scenario that something
goes wrong the negative public relations prohibits a company from publishing mistakes.
Outages of deployment pipelines are therefore only published if the result was visible
to users of a service. This question is again helping to discover the influence that
unintended changes in deployment pipelines have over real environments.
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What kind of software is processed by the pipeline?
With the question about the final result of a pipeline, the severity of an outage can
be identified. Is the resulting image of a pipeline a service that is used internally the
potential danger that can result from an outage in such an environment is most likely
less dramatic than the failure of the greeting web page. This question can possibly help
to answer the question how much benefit would be gained from a prevention system in
what kind of pipelines.
Severity of an outage?
This question is asked to see how important a well functioning pipeline is to the company
in which the case study is conducted. The solution that enhances a pipeline to protect
it against unintended configuration changes depends on the priority that the pipeline
has. If a pipeline is vital to the service that a company provides the solution can be more
expensive than a solution in a pipeline that is only responsible for a feature/service that
is "nice to have".
Recovery time from an outage connected to unintended changes in a deployment
pipeline?
This question is an addition to the previous two. Depending on how long the mean
time to repair (MTTR) of an outage is, that was the result of an configuration error, it
can be assessed how much a prevention technique is desired and how much work is it
worth to spend on a prevention technique. It is also worth looking into the recovery
time since configuration errors are according to Yin et al. [YMZ+11] sometimes hard to
spot. Verifying this would continue to strengthen the justification of this thesis.
3.4.5 Discovery of Implemented Prevention Techniques
In both motivational examples in chapter 2 it was mentioned that there are internal
change prevention techniques running in the mentioned services. This lead to the
assumption that unintended configuration change is a problem that is handled by
each company privately. This set of questions is focusing on learning about prevention
techniques that have possibly been already implemented in the examined environment.
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What extends the pipeline to prohibit unintended configuration changes?
Question to see what is already dealt with and what was considered a potential problem
in the pipeline that has already been handled. Everything that does not serve a function-
ality that is required to build, test and deploy code can be an answer to this question.
Possible examples would be additional tools to monitor the pipeline, custom in house
software or just simply (Jenkins) plug-ins.
Lack of automation prohibiting deployment pipelines?
If so what processes are considered not to be automated and why. It is thinkable that
because some things (e.g., exploratory tests [Wol16]) are considered impossible to
be automated, a continuous delivery pipeline itself is considered to be a prevention
technique in contrast to a deployment pipeline.
3.5 Planned Data Collection Methodology
The methodology on how to collect data in a case study is shown in the used guidelines
for this case study [RH08]. Data is gathered at two different companies that are
contributing to this thesis and are described in Section 3.8.1 and 3.8.2.
At company Alpha multiple pipelines will be examined to have different sources of data
from which conclusions can be triangulated.
Triangulating data from multiple data sources enhances the credibility of the case study
[BJ08]. The chosen data collection technique is classified as direct or at a first degree
level. The used technique is called interview. The interview is conducted in one of the
proposed interview models. The questions that are displayed in Section 3.4 are ordered
according to the time glass model.
As the time glass model proposes, the interview is starting with loose conversation
that then narrows down to the important information. If the important information
sufficiently covered, the interview questions are less important and the interview is
becoming more loose conversation again.
The interview starts with the introduction of the topic and some easy to answer questions
about the interviewed expert. The questions then narrow down to specify suspicions that
came up during research of the topic. After all specific questions have been answered,
the interview is becoming less structured. Near the end of the interview, the questions
start to become more loose conversation what the expert personally thinks about the
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topic and how he would engage it. The last part of the interview would then be a
short summary what the findings were to prevent misunderstandings. The interview is
therefore only structured in the middle of the interview while at the beginning and close
to the end it is unstructured.
Runeson and Höst [RH08] propose that the audio of the interview is recorded. This
recommendation is followed. Details are therefore easier to catch since the interview can
be listened to multiple times. It is also recommended that the transition from interview
to text is done by the person who conducted the interview. This recommendation is also
accommodated. The last recommendation that proposes that the subjects that are inter-
viewed are based on differences instead of similarities. This is only partially followed.
Different people are getting interviewed but all of these need to have a background
of being people that deal on technical basis with a pipeline. Should the examining of
pipelines and environment reveal that both, development and operations, are still differ-
ent departments that both have access to the configuration of their pipelines, then at
least one interview will be conducted with an expert from each of those departments.
3.6 Protocol and Data Collection Improvements
Runeson and Höst [RH08] specifically mention that the case study protocol has to be
a "continuously changed document that is updated". After conducting the first case
study at company Beta, the results have been gathered and can be seen in Section 3.12.
Based on this first case study, the procedure of collecting data and questions that are
asked in the interview have been adjusted. The following sections summarize how the
protocol changed after the first case study. The updated protocol was already shown in
Section3.4.
Introduction of the thesis and the interviewer
This question was added to build some common ground between interviewed expert
and the interviewer. Like mentioned in Section 2.3 each pipeline and the resulting
deployment process looks different at each company. The first set of questions is anyway
not built to gain information but rather to build trust between the two people conducting
the interview.
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What kind of continuous pipeline is used for the deployment of software (continuous -
integration, delivery or deployment)?
This question was added to explicitly clarify what kind of pipeline is examined. The ideal
state of continuous deployment that would be the best pipeline to look at is currently
not state of the art. As a result the examined pipelines are mostly not ideal. The design
of this case study in Section 3.2 acknowledges this problem and refers to possibly not
ideal pipelines to collect information about how to approach unintended configuration
changes in continuous deployment pipelines.
Introduction and general information
This first set of questions was originally called "Expert Background". Because of the
extensions made the first set of questions no longer contains only information about the
expert. The name was therefore changed in the question protocol to clarify what the
section is about.
How does the entire deployment process usually look like?
This questions was added for the same reason that question "Introduction of the thesis
and the interviewer" was added. Getting some common ground on the deployment
process is important because each deployment process looks different. This is the
mostly unstructured and it lets the expert talk freely. It also helps to get both (expert
and interviewer) on the same page about where the deployment process and the
corresponding pipeline are currently at.
How many configuration interfaces impact the behavior of the pipeline?
The previous question was vaguely formulated. The intentions however do not have
changed. The ideal answer to this question on would be a specific number. It is however
not important what the number is. More importantly is if the interviewed expert has still
an overview of the pipeline and could know/count all the interfaces that can influence
the behavior of a pipeline. If this is not the case then a lack of over site is probably
existing.
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How many configuration values impact the behavior of a pipeline and how dangerous
are single values?
This question was, like the previous one, vaguely formulated. The question was changed
to specify what the information is that should be gathered. The intention however
stays the same. A large pipeline can, much like custom software, result in a knowledge
distribution [PSV01]. The result being that changes are made that should be made
because changes result in unintended side effects.
How much time is assigned to the task of changing the configuration of a pipeline? &
how often does a pipeline change?
Both questions stayed the same. The change that was made is that "How often does
a pipeline change?" is now placed before "How much Time is assigned to the Task of
Changing the Configuration of a Pipeline?". This is because the new order benefits are
more natural interview style where less time is required to introduce a question.
How does testing the pipeline work?
The previous question was about testing the code inside the pipeline. This however
deviated to far from the intention of this thesis and the case study. It was mentioned
by Baxter and Jack [BJ08] and refereed to in Section 3.2.2 that a common problem by
conducting case studies is that the study is not precisely about what the intention of the
study was. This question was therefore changed to gather information about testing the
pipeline. The question about testing the pipeline that was already existing is therefore
eliminated since it is now a duplicate.
What kind of software is processed by the pipeline?
This question was rephrased to specify what information should be gathered. The
previous question (what is the target of the pipeline) could be easily misinterpreted.
3.7 Ethical Considerations
Ethical considerations are mainly taken into account because the guidelines propose
them [RH08]. In fact both companies that are contributing to this thesis do not want
41
3 Case Study
to be named for legal and competitive reasons. The data that is displayed to give a
brief overview of the context of the company in 3.8.2 is approved by a manager of the
company. The data that is displayed from company Alpha is also approved. The name of
maintainers/developers that are interviewed are not displayed because naming those
does not serve a purpose from which information can be gathered to improve the case
study.
3.8 Contributing Companies
Two companies are contributing to this thesis. Both companies are presented in Sections
3.8.1 and 3.8.2. The main difference between those is that company Alpha, as an
insurance provider, is heavily dependent on customer contact (business to consumer).
This is provided by amongst other things web services that are deployed through
delivery/deployment pipelines. Company Beta is developing and building hardware for
industrial purposes only (business to business). Software is merely a byproduct that runs
those products. Both of these companies operate in completely different environments
with different sizes and importance of their software products.
3.8.1 Company Alpha
For legal reasons this company does not want to be named in this thesis. The company
is operating on a global scale with more than 100.000 employees. The examined local
office complex employs more than 1000 employees from which more than 100 people
develop in-house software tools. These numbers are broadly summarized to preserve the
anonymity of the company. The company is a large insurance provider and as such the
legal obligations are playing an important roll in providing information. The company
is heavily dependent on businesses to consumer contact. Such is realized by human
interaction and a digital appearance on the Internet. The here fore used web pages
and the underlying architecture (e.g., webs servers) is at some point running through
a delivery pipeline. Besides web applications, in-house software that is required for in
house tasks and server back end services are also running through delivery pipelines. It
is estimated (exact numbers are not known by the company) that roughly 200 Jenkins
instances are used. Each of those instances is used by a team which can build any
needed number of pipelines. The exact number of existing pipelines is therefore also not
known.
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3.8.2 Company Beta
For legal reasons this company does not want to be named in this thesis either. The
company is operating on a global scale with more than 10.000 employees. The location
in which the case study was conducted employs more than 500 people. The team
that uses the examined pipeline has the size of ten people from which one of those is
responsible for the pipeline. He is also the leader of the team that tests the software.
The company is developing and building hardware products that are used for industrial
purposes only. Customers are only other industrial companies. Business to consumer
(single human being) relationships are non-existent. The products that are developed
and built are for example pumps that can then be installed in ships, pools or similar
environments where pumps are needed. The software that is developed is embedded
firmware that controls these hardware machines. The hardware that is developed
has lifespans of about thirty years. During the lifetime of a product the software is
continuously extended.
3.9 Case Study Execution at Company Alpha
This case study was conducted on 2018-06-22 at company Alpha. Due to the size and age
of this company, there are a lot of legacy systems, processes, and existing approaches.
The case study was conducted by interviewing a team member of about 20 people
which are working on a single project. The interviewee is one of three people in the
project which are mainly working with the pipelines of the project. The project realizes
interaction capabilities with large business customers. The project is a development of
a system that is already in place. The new implementation that is done right now is
replacing the old version as soon as it is able to serve clients with base functionalities.
Despite the legacy culture, processes, and systems, the company is trying to keep up with
the latest technology. New projects like the one observed by this case study are trying to
use modern approaches like DevOps, Cloud Computing and Pipelines. The interview
took close to two hours and was conducted about two months after the first case study
at company B. Since it was the second case study, it featured the already updated
question protocol that can be seen in Section 3.4. This time the introduction to the
topic of this thesis was a more structured approach which resulted in the desired effect.
The interviewer and interviewee build a relaxed atmosphere over the first couple of
questions. As a result the more important questions that followed up on the introductory
part where approached with an open mind and no defensive stance of the interviewee.
Similar to the first case study at company Beta the introduction also served as a short
period where both interview partners could gather a common ground of knowledge
about the topic and the structure of the project.
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3.10 Answers of Company Alpha
The following section contains the answers to the question protocol which was designed
before the the case studies where conducted. The protocol that is used in this case study
is however already refined by the feedback and learned lessons from the first case study
at company Beta. Conclusions and results from both case studies are not drawn here.
Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 4. The following sections only contain the answers as
"raw data" from the conducted interview.The interpretation of gathered data is done in
Chapter 4 where both case studies are included in the analysis.
3.10.1 Introduction of the Thesis, the Interviewer and the Interviewee
How long has the expert been working with the pipeline?
The expert has been working with the pipeline for about one and a half year.
How did the Expert Encounter the Pipeline for the First Time?
The expert was introduced to pipelines in the project. A colleague that was resigning
built the previous pipeline and gave a short introduction to pipelines in general (about
half a day). After that the pipeline functionality was a learning by doing task.
What kind of continuous pipeline is used for the deployment of software (continuous -
integration, delivery or deployment)
The current state would be described as a delivery pipeline. Is it at any point necessary
to deploy code to production it is possible to do this in about 15 minutes if everybody
who needs to confirm releases is available. This delivery process of manual release
confirms is still existing in the company. These processes of signing of new production
software is still existing, even in this more modern approach of developing software
agile. The company is trying to be more agile in its new projects but cant let go of the
last additional overview of software.
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How does the entire deployment process usually look like?
Each developer develops code in his own branch. When a feature completed the
branch gets merged into the master branch of the project. The master branch is then
built on a development VM instance in a manner of continuous integration. If the
development instance is considered worth releasing, the code that was used to build
the development instance is then taken to build the project on a new VM instance
where product owners have to look over the functionality. Once the product owner
satisfied with the new/changed functionality of the software,the same code is used
to build on an additional server instance which does an integration test. This is not
necessarily a sequential procedure. The building, testing, and deployment of code
to the product owner VM and the integration test VM can be done in parallel. This
integration test instance is as close to the production environment as possible. These
steps are all happening automatically but need a manual trigger to start because of
required confirmations from humans. These steps form a single pipeline that is called
development pipeline where a graphic representation can be seen in Figure 3.2. If all
these steps considered to be okay the deployment pipeline is triggered manually. The
deployment pipeline stores the new image as well as the used code and test results in
specific revision tools. It also requests the last approval from a manager. These steps
form a release pipeline which is graphically represented in Figure 3.3. After the last
approval is given the deployment release pipeline gets manually triggered. This last
pipeline pushes the previously stored image to the production environment. This last
pipeline is shown in Figure 3.4.
3.10.2 Implementation of Methods and Techniques Proposed by
Literature
Git, AWS, Jenkins: Are these the used Tools?
These are exactly the tools that are used. Additionally a cloud platform for Docker
container called Open Shift is used together with some in-house tools for storing code,
test results and images for a long time. Static code analysis is done by SonarQube.
Is continuous deployment the desired target?
Before the current project that the expert is working on was started, it was decided on a
management level that new projects are developed with agile development techniques.
The current state is a Continuous Delivery Pipeline in which several steps require
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Figure 3.2: Development Pipeline at Company Alpha
Figure 3.3: Release Pipeline at Company Alpha
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Figure 3.4: Deployment Pipeline at Company Alpha
human admission to allow the continuing of the release process. Are all required
people accessible, the process of deploying new software to production takes about
15 minutes. The steps of human oversight however would not be possible inside
a continuous deployment pipeline. On paper the target of continuous deployment
pipelines was explicitly stated and is still existing. The team that develops the software
would also prefer to use a continuous deployment approach instead of a continuous
delivery approach. The expert however doubts that the cultural change, that would be
required on a management level to transition towards a continuous deployment pipeline,
is coming.
How serious is the security in a deployment pipeline Taken?
Multiple security steps are implemented. The Jenkins instance is only accessible through
the web UI. The server on which the Jenkins instance is running is hosted by a different
department in the company. This department is centralized and deals only with providing
other departments with Jenkins instances. Is a new instance required the Jenkins
department hosts a new one (automatically) and sends the web address to the team
which requires the new Jenkins instance. The newly hosted Jenkins instance is only
accessible while the person requesting access is working from inside the intranet of
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the company. To gain access to the intranet, a company account has to exist. This
company account has to be requested and has password several checks that prohibit
simple passwords for the company account. Jenkins accounts for developers are also
made. These Jenkins accounts do not have administrative rights. Settings like the
global configuration file are already preconfigured by the Jenkins department. The
communication between Jenkins and the test/production environments is encrypted
and maintained by the centralized Jenkins department. Since the pipeline is stored as
a Jenkins file inside the project source code for which it is required, the SCM is also
secured in a specific manner. The company uses its own GitHub which is also only
accessible through the intranet of the company. Additionally a two factor authentication
is set for the internal GitHub. Each developer has access right to the test environments.
The production environment is however also secured with another account (Name
and Password). This account is only for the production environment. The account
authentications are know to only two specially chosen developers.
DevOps - Definition, how and why is implementation a desired target
Similar to the described case in Section 3.10.2 it was decided that agile methods are
used. Therefore the usage of DevOps is existing on paper. It is however mainly used
because DevOps is named in the context of agile software development. One person is
placed inside the developing team which is only doing operational tasks. The team of
developers however define them selfs all as DevOps by the following Definition:
Everybody needs to be able to develop the application as well as having the capability to
run the application or keep the application running in the production environment.
3.10.3 Verification or Disproval of Suspected Influence Factors
Are slips while inserting considered a threat?
Slips are existing but not considered a Threat. Building or modifying a Pipeline happens
based on Trail and Error in a testing environment. During this time slips do happen but
the modification and testing is happening on a different branch which gets merged back
into the master when the new modifications/pipeline are working on the temporary
branch. Live deploys happen in a canary testing manner which is described in Section
2.6.4.
48
3.10 Answers of Company Alpha
DevOps - What are the remaining differences between development and operation and
how is each department trained?
The development team and the one operator are sitting in the same location attending
the same meetings and discussing the progress of the software together. The remaining
differences are that the operator is only doing operational tasks while the developers
are able to operate the application but stick mostly to developing the application.
Who has access to a pipeline and its configuration?
Since the pipelines are configured in Jenkins files which are stored inside the projects
repository, it is possible for each developer that can commit to a repository, to change the
pipeline and its behavior. The administrative settings of the used Jenkins instance are
accessible by three people in the developing team. These three people deal more than
the average developer with pipelines. Those pipeline administrators can for example
add new users to the Jenkins instance. The administrative users however have also
only access to the web UI and can’t connect to the underling virtual machine that runs
the Jenkins server. Access to this VM is only given to the Jenkins department that
was already mentioned in Section 3.10.2. The expert added the comment "even we
administrators have relatively few access rights. In the end the Jenkins department
decides what runs on those virtual machines".
How many different pipelines exist and what is the difference between those?
The development pipeline is one pipeline which is responsible for each step and can
be seen in Figure 3.2. The displayed stages are a conditional executions depending on
where the pipeline is at. To simplify here is an example: The pipeline is triggered and
choosable parameter are set depending on what is required. The pipeline is building
and deploying on the corresponding platform (Developer VM, Product Owner VM or
System integration VM). Conditional code is executed that corresponds to the current
task. Is the pipeline triggered again with different parameters the same pipeline is
executed with other conditional code to execute the currently parameterized pipeline to
deploy to the selected test environment. The other pipelines that are used are to prepare
the deployment process (Figure 3.3) and to do the actual deployment (Figure 3.4) in
production. The team uses these only three pipelines to deploy code. One big pipeline
for each branch/task with different conditions and two pipelines that are used to deploy
the code to production.
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Are there executing conditions in a pipeline?
Yes. Since there is only one pipeline for multiple different branches the pipeline is no
longer just a couple of lines long. The pipeline consists of a shared library, ten different
classes, about 900 lines of code and is responsible for each branch in each of the three
testing environments (seen in Figure 3.2). It is no longer a sequential procedure of steps.
The pipeline has conditions, loops, exceptions and everything that is used in a regular
(complex) software system. Side effects have turned up in the past, but strict separation
of functions and communication between team members could resolve those. Library
functions (e.g. downloadFilesFromRepository) are heavily parameterized so that they
can be used by everyone who is using the pipeline.
How many configuration interfaces impact the behavior of the pipeline?
The tools that can potentially be integrated in a pipeline are all managed centralized.
These tools (e.g. Jenkins, SonarQube, in house custom Repositories) are therefore
already configured when they are requested. With the exception of the Jenkins adminis-
trative team members, there are no configuration interfaces that can be interacted with.
The pipelines them selfs, which are configured through Jenkins file can be changed. To
run a pipeline the branch and a test environment has to be selected. this is done with
two drop down menus which displays the name of the branch and the test environment
as strings. The answer to this question is therefore only two interfaces from which one
is regularly used and the other is only accessible by a limited amount of people.
How many configuration values impact the behavior of a pipeline and how dangerous
are those?
The regularly used configuration interface has three different test environments as seen
in Figure 3.2. The number of branches that can be deployed is summed up to eleven.
The drop down menu that defines the test environment is hard coded. The second
menu which displays the different branches is generated procedurally, depending on
the branches existing within the repository. The regularly used interface has therefore
only 14 values which are deploying code to testing environments. A wrongful selection
deploys only the wrong code to testing, which can be fixed by running the pipeline again
with the right configuration values.
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How often does a pipeline change?
On average the pipeline changes every two weeks. The trigger for a change event is
sometimes externally. An example would be that a used pipeline tool is changed or
added. The other, much more frequent, reason for change is the self optimizing demand
that the team members have by them selfs. The members browse news and new features
that can used to improve the pipeline. They are not yet completely satisfied with the
state that the pipeline is in. An example of such an optimization, that has still to come,
is that if a new build is triggered and an old build is still building, the old building gets
stopped and only the new one gets build.
How much time is assigned to the task of changing the configuration of a pipeline?
Big centralized changes like updates or the required usage of an in house pipeline tool
get scheduled like any feature of the developed software. These tasks are large and can
take a lot of time. The last tool that had to be used in the pipeline (because of company
policy) took the interviewed expert 3 weeks to implement correctly into the pipeline.
Other features that are just nice to have are tracked as minor tasks or not at all.
How familiar is a pipeline maintainer to the tools that are used in the pipeline and how
often do the maintainers change?
Besides Jenkins plug-ins the tools that can be used in the pipeline are tools that are
managed centralized. Additional tooling is not possible since access to the virtual
machines is only partially existent to maintainers of the pipeline. The maintainers are
therefore not able to change/configure pipeline tools. All development team members
are considered to be pipeline maintainers. Therefore the maintainers change every time
the development team grows or shrinks in the size of people.
How many people change a pipeline on a regular basis and how closely do they work
together?
There are a core of three people that mainly deal with pipelines. These three work
closely together by communication about pipelines and changes on a regular basis. A
scheduled task/story of changing a pipeline is however only worked on by one person
at a time. Every other member of the development team should have the capability
to change the used pipelines. Are all three core developers unavailable (e.g. sick, ill,
vacation, conference, ...) other people of the team are supposed to change the pipeline.
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These other people are then forced if it is necessary to make a change to one of the
pipelines. If changes are made to pipelines, those get reviewed with two other people
(mostly the core pipeline maintainers) to present the made changes.
How many times do unintended configuration changes originate from
humans/machines?
On source for unintended configuration changes are technical changes like updates.
Besides updates, at the beginning of the project there where some problems in which
changes where not tested for each feasible case. As a result the pipelines sometimes did
not work in any given case.
How does testing the pipeline work?
Testing only works on a trail and error basis. Testing frameworks for pipelines are
according to the expert just now showing up. The expert states, that at this time, he
knows of only one framework which is not developed by a person in private. Because of
current deadlines the application of a testing framework is fading into the background.
The application of a testing framework has a high priority inside the team, but current
deadlines are more important. An IDE for pipelines is also not used/existing yet. The
testing of the pipeline is considered to be one of the biggest weakness of the current
project.
3.10.4 Discovery of Additional Influence Factors, Outages and Priority
Do known outages exist in regard to unintended configuration changes in the
deployment pipeline?
No. If changes where made that where not sufficiently tested it was occurring at the
start of the project, that a pipeline could fail sometimes. Unintended changes however
did not occur. Mostly because pipelines only change by changing the configuration file.
Input parameters are given by drop down menus. Configuration interfaces to tools are
blocked or not accessible at all.
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How often are pipeline connected outages visible to clients of the environment
produced by the pipeline?
Production environment outages produced by a pipeline are not existing. Even if there
would be a problem with the pipeline the user/client would not notice. This is because
of so called blue-green-deployment. Blue-green deployment (or canary release, canary
testing) is explicitly described in Section 2.6.4.
Target of the pipeline?
The software that is developed is a business to customer website in which specific
customers can inform, enroll and managed in specific offers of the company. The entire
project runs through pipelines. Front end and back end are both running through the
same pipeline.
Severity of an outage?
The project is still in its starting phase. This means that currently only one hundred
internal users use some basic functions of the system. Currently an outage would not
be dramatic at all. If the system is one day in production, the development team is
responsible for the software during the day. During night times there are other maintain
departments which would, in case of an outage, handle the situation temporarily by
opening error sites or similar quick fixes. There are no people of the development team
on call during the night.
Recovery time from an outage connected to unintended changes in a deployment
pipeline?
Since there are no outages in connection to unintended configuration changes, there are
no recovery times yet. The fixing of a bug in production usually takes about half a day
to a day.
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3.10.5 Discovery of Implemented Prevention Techniques
What extends the pipeline to prohibit unintended configuration changes?
There are no specific extensions to prohibit unintended configuration changes. Pipelines
are parameterized by drop down menus for different settings. This certainly helps to
prevent simple errors but it was made for convenience and not to prevent errors. The
so called green-blue testing ensures that no faulty software is deployed to the major
public. It was however implemented to ensure quality of the software that runs through
a pipeline and not test the pipeline in any way. It has the positive side effect that if a
pipeline crashed during the building process, the production environment is still running
and unaffected from the change.
Lack of automation prohibiting deployment pipelines?
The Expert states that there are no Technological boundaries to transition towards a
Continuous Deployment Pipeline. Modifying the current pipelines so that the deployment
process is done continuously would simply require the removal of all manual triggers
and the merging of the three current pipelines that can be seen in previously mentioned
Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 to be merged into one. This process of merging the pipelines would
take approximately two days at most.
3.10.6 Case Study Summary at Company Alpha
The company is using a state of the art delivery pipeline. The company distributes a
lot of resources towards building, maintaining and tooling used by the pipelines. The
centralized management of pipelines tools reduces the workload on developers that are
building and modifying pipelines. It also prevents production of errors in pipelines since
the used tools are managed by a centralized team. All used tools are state of the art and
reflect current technology. The observed team is constantly looking into new technologies
and practices to improve the state of the current pipeline. The company has some cultural
processes that struggle with adapting new agile techniques like the fast deployment that
comes with continuous delivery/deployment. These cultural processes don’t seem to
change in the near future. They seem to be the major roadblock in transitioning towards
continuous deployment methods. Unintended configuration changes are explicitly not
considered a problem. The amount of resources (e.g., development time, congresses,
technological extensions) distributed towards pipelining seems to be enough to ensure
that the deployment process, which is realized with continuous delivery pipelines, is
not failing. The technological extension of blue-green deployment entirely prevents
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the undesired effect of deployment pipelines on the live environment, no matter what
problems within a pipeline exist. This includes unintended configuration changes. In
the end it is important to note that the case study was done on a single project in the
company. Not all projects in the company are as advanced as the observed project is.
The interviewed expert stated that even in other new projects that are developed with
agile development techniques in mind, agile processes are not adapted.
3.11 Observed Incident at Company Alpha
Not during the interview but during the observation time at the company, an incident
in context of unintended configuration changes was observed at company Alpha. Most
notably in a different project which was not part of the case study.
A demonstration of how the deployment process works was scheduled at eight o’clock
in the morning. The software was successfully built by a delivery pipeline. All tests
of the delivery pipeline accepted the current build. A Jenkins pipeline that purely
deploys this specific service to production was already set up because the service was
deployed in the past. This deployment pipeline was manually triggered. At some point
during this deployment process, the live environment is not accessible for users until
the deployment was successful. Since this specific deployment pipeline is only used for
the actual deployment step, it only gets used if a new deploy to production is planned.
During the observed deployment process an error of the used Jenkinsfile was responsible
for an only partially successful deployment. Due to a change that had been made to
the deployment pipeline a block of (groovy) script code was moved from inside a stage
into a new stage. The moved script was responsible for using a plug-in which is used
to verify the validity of deployed code. Due to the move of the code from one stage
to another, a parameterized value was no longer in scope. As a result the value was
considered null and the plug-in read null instead of the needed integer. The plug-in
crashed. The final result was that the pipeline deployed the built image to production
but could not use the validation plug-in due to its crash. The described error was found
later on. The incident was not taken as a serious problem because until this point the
crashed validation plug-in is a new functionality which is not mandatory to use. The
inaccessibility of the service due to deploying a new version is also accepted as a cost
of deployment. The inaccessibility took about one minute until the new image was
deployed. The deployment process is split in 8 stages. These stages are all sequential
executed but some are containing executing conditions. An abstracted version of the
control flow diagram of deployment pipeline is displayed in Figure 3.5
55
3 Case Study
Figure 3.5: Deployment Control Flow 1 Figure 3.6: Deployment Control Flow 2
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3.12 Case Study Execution at Company Beta
This case study was conducted on 12th April 2018 at the company where the deployment
pipelines are used.
The aim of this case study was to verify or disprove the suspected influence factors that
can potentially alter the behavior of a deployment pipeline in an unintended way. The
planned sequence on how the case study was planned to be executed can be seen in
Section 3.2.3. A deviation from the planned sequence was done at the beginning. The
first two questions were designed to build a relaxed and secure atmosphere on which
the important part of the interview could be conducted. This part was highly extended.
It featured not only some background information about the expert and how long he has
been working with the deployment of software. It also contained general information
about the history and development of the deployment process at the company. This
helped the researcher and the interviewed expert to get on common ground when
talking about the deployment process and the implemented pipelines. This extended
intro was the adapted for further case studies.
An additional positive side effect was that since the expert was talking so freely about
the topic that he was extremely motivated to provide information about the imple-
mented deployment processes and the usage of pipelines. This extension however was
unstructured and did not contain information specifically about unintended changes in
continuous deployment pipelines.
One important addition to the set of questions should be mentioned here. Examined
pipelines that are part of the a deployment process are not necessarily continuous de-
ployment pipelines. A question were the expert specifies to what extend the deployment
pipelines contains continuous techniques was added and asked at the beginning of the
interview. The interview was done without significant interruption and took 2 hours and
27 minutes to complete. Like planned the interview was recorded and the recording was
used to gather the information that is displayed in the following section.
3.13 Answers of Company Beta
The following section contains the answers to the questions that were designed previous
to the case study. Conclusions are not drawn in this section because the recommended
data triangulation requires more than one source of information. Conclusions will be
drawn later on in Chapter 4 after all case studies were conducted. For qualitative data
interpretation [RH08] all answers from conducted case studies will be gathered to see if
there are reoccurring influence factors that have been detected.
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3.13.1 Intro and General Information
How long has the expert been working with the pipeline?
The Expert has been working with continuous integration for six years. Since the
beginning the company has used Jenkins to realize a continuous integration pipeline.
The expert is the only one working with the pipeline and he build it from ground up by
himself.
How did the expert encounter the pipeline the first time?
Before a Jenkins pipeline was build, automated test scripts that had to be started manu-
ally were used. At some point the team manager heard about continuous integration and
a Jenkins pipeline was build. The pipeline was extended over the years. In the beginning
it was a tool that was used on the side. Because the time effort for automated testing
with Jenkins grew over time, the expert is now head of a testing team that overlooks the
automation of the pipeline. Tasks for building or changing a pipeline now get scheduled
in the used time management tool.
What kind of continuous pipeline is used for the deployment of software (continuous
integration, delivery or deployment)?
The used pipeline is a continuous integration pipeline. Building a complete package
(multiple software tools and documents) that can then be deployed to a customer is still
done manually. The process of building such a complete package took about 3 weeks
before continuous integration was implemented. Now days the delivery process takes
about three days.
How does the entire deployment process usually look like?
During development a stable trunk is maintained in the repository. Developers branch
the repository and then develop a feature. At any point during the development a
developer can start the automated tests on his branch. After a Developer is finished
building his feature he can then merge the branch into the trunk. The trunk does a
nightly build where all existing automated tests are executed. The time that all unit
test need sums up to about one hour. Unit tests are executed in a hardware duplicate
of a shipped product. Is it required to release a new version of the build software a
chain of manual events is worked on. A set of release tests are triggered manually to the
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current trunk. About 3 hours later the release tests are finished. Almost always during
those release tests at least one bug appears and has to be fixed. Are all bugs removed a
final image of the software is made. Documents about new features are then updated
(partially automated). A package of the image and the updated documents is composed
manually. This is then tested by manually simulating customer behavior. Is this final test
also successful people in the hardware production department get notified (manually)
that a new software is available. The software gets then send by external hardware to
the production department were it can be used. This process of releasing new software
is done mostly by hand and takes about 3 days to finish.
3.13.2 Implementation of Methods and Techniques Proposed by
Literature
Git, AWS, Jenkins: Are these the used tools?
Used tools are Jenkins as an continuous integration server and Subversion as as a source
control management system. Jenkins was the first continuous integration tool that
was used at the company. There was no need to replace it since it is satisfying the
needs of the company. Subversion is used for similar reasons. Since the source control
management system was integrated into the development team it was satisfying the
need of the users of the system and there was no need to transition towards another
system. In addition to the missing need of using another source control management
system (e.g. GIT), the company has still some legacy code in an older source control
management system called CVS (Concurrent Versions System). Management and team
members agree that using a third source control management system would not be
beneficial. Even the idea of replacing a working tool with a new one, that has then be
learned, is rejected by the members of the team.
Is continuous deployment the desired target?
Automating the process of delivering software (building a package of software and
documentation that is then send to production) is an ideal target that the company
wants to be eventually. It is however a task that is not scheduled yet. No timetable exists
when this should be done. Building a complete deployment pipeline is not a desired
target. It is not seen as useful because the time spans in which the company operates
are quite large (e.g. 30 years of product life cycle of a hardware part). Using a couple
of days to deploy new code is not seen as a problem. The fear of having bugs in the
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system after automated tests are past is to immense. This is especially because fixing a
bug would require hardware callbacks that are costly.
How serious is the security in a deployment pipeline taken?
Security was taken into consideration by building the pipeline. The continuous integra-
tion server on which the pipeline is build is physically standing in a secure environment.
Access rights are coupled to the windows active directory. The team that uses the
pipeline has only limited administration rights on the server. The server is maintained
by the operations department. Each developer that has to write code, that then uses the
pipeline, is granted limited access to the continuous integration server.
DevOps - Definition, how and why is implementation a desired target?
By DevOps the interviewed experts understands "the connecting between development
and everything that has to do with IT". Development defines the writing of code and the
programming of (in his example) hardware. The term operations can, again according
to the interviewed expert, be extended to IT-operations. This means operations provides
services like for example the installation of an compiler, an Integrated development
environment or an source control management system. The definition of DevOps would
be the connection of both departments that handle these to services. Implementing
DevOps is not an desired target. To quote the broadest definition of what DevOps means
is " bridging the gap between development and operations" [JAPT16]. According to this
definition, the operators of the software are more likely customers that use the bought
hardware products that runs the firmware that is running inside the hardware.
3.13.3 Verification or Disproval of Suspected Influence Factors
Are slips while inserting considered a thread?
Slips are explicitly considered a thread. Previous to this interview, there were multiple
incidences were a faulty pipeline was the result of a configuration change. The config-
uration change was not made properly and resulted in an undesired behavior of the
pipeline. According to the definition in Chapter 2 Section 2.2 the pipeline contained
an unintended configuration change. The result was that the next nightly build failed
because of the wrongful configuration and not because of the code that uses the pipeline.
Since this was a reoccurring problem the company transitioned from manually changing
a pipeline to configuring it with script files. Those are then stored in the repository.
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The company effectively uses code as infrastructure (see Section 2.6.3) to undo/fix
changes that are caused by unintended configuration changes. Using scripts to configure
a pipeline also reduced the number of times when a slip caused an error and increased
the speed of configuring a pipeline. It however did not completely eradicate them.
DevOps - What are the remaining differences between development and operation and
how is each department trained?
Referring to the answer of "DevOps - How and Why is Implementation a Desired Target?".
DevOps is not implemented and therefore this question has no answer (it was however
part of the interview).
Who has access to a pipeline and its configuration?
Since code is stored in the repository, everyone who has access to the repository could
also change the behavior of the pipeline by modifying the configuration. It is however the
case that each person who has access to the repository also has access to the continuous
integration server. An exception is made to the installation directory of Jenkins and
the administration rights to the continuous integration server. To those only the IT
department and the team leader have the ability to make changes after inserting an
additional password.
How many different pipelines exist and what is the difference between those?
There exist about 60 pipelines. For a single product there are about five pipelines that
are only differentiated by a name. Besides a different name these pipelines are almost
exactly the same. It is not excluded to mistakenly change the wrong pipeline.
Are there executing conditions in a pipeline?
No. There are no conditions existing in a pipeline. If a pipeline fails at a certain point
because of a failure it is stopped. However if a pipeline is well functioning and all
manual pipeline tests are successful the procedure of a pipeline is always exactly the
same.
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How many configuration interfaces impact the behavior of the pipeline?
The answer to this is not clear. The expert counted a lot of possibilities were a configu-
ration interface/file/value could change the behavior of a pipeline. So many however
that the expert could not come up with a specific number because it is not clear how
many configuration interfaces are existing in additional tools that are part of the existing
pipelines. The final answer to this question were "a lot".
How many configuration values impact the behavior of a pipeline and how dangerous
are single values?
No specific answer. Because the previous question could not be answered definitively
this could also not be answered. Specifically dangerous and non dangerous values exist
but most of the configuration values could, if an unintended or intendedly harmful
change was made, alter the behavior of the pipeline so that it would not work correctly
anymore.
How often does a pipeline change?
After the creation of a pipeline it changes frequently until all required tasks are imple-
mented. This takes about a week to set up a new well functioning pipeline. After this
initial phase it is not usual that a pipeline changes.
How much time is assigned to the task of changing the configuration of a pipeline?
In the past building and maintaining Jenkins pipelines was done as a side activity
by developing software. Since the automation of integration and possibly delivering
continuously takes more and more time, it is now possible to explicitly schedule tasks to
change/modify a pipeline. The time gets tracked and it is compared to the past more
time available to change a pipeline.
How familiar is a pipeline maintainer to the tools that are used in the pipeline and how
often do the maintainers change?
All pipelines are build and maintained by the interviewed expert. Also all additional tools
that are used are explored and plugged in by the expert. The maintainer of the pipeline
is since the beginning of continuous integration the same person. The interviewed expert
62
3.13 Answers of Company Beta
was the only one in the company that dealt with continuous integration and pipeline
building.
How many people change a pipeline on a regular basis and how closely do they work
together?
Only the interviewed expert.
How many times do unintended configuration changes originate from
humans/machines?
The interviewed expert explicitly answered this question with "rather Humans Errors".
How does testing the pipeline work?
Simple syntax checker for paths are in place. Besides that, each pipeline has to be tested
manually before it is deployed the the first time. Ideas like having an duplicated Jenkins
server where tests are done first have been thrown around but are not implemented. The
interviewed expert mentioned that it would be helpful to have a duplicated continuous
integration server to preempt errors. It was however questionable if the spent effort
would provide a significant payout.
3.13.4 Discovery of Additional influence factors, outages and priority
Do known outages exist in regard to unintended configuration changes in the
deployment pipeline?
These outages of the continuous integration server exist. The most common problem for
an outage is a misconfiguration by inserting a slip (accidental wrong input e.g. character
subsumption). This was also explained in question 3.13.3. Slips are still a problem but
they have been reduced by using script files to build the Jenkins configuration. Other
existing outages are rare. There was a single incident where the Jenkins plug-in for
subversion was not working properly after an update of Jenkins. The result being that
the plug-in failed to do a checkout. Jenkins could then not build a project. This meant
that a nightly build would fail.
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How often are pipeline connected outages visible to clients of the environment
produced by the pipeline?
A client does not see any of those incidents/outages. This is because the company only
uses a continuous integration technique. The deployment is still done manually and has
to go through a longer process.
What kind of software is processed by the pipeline?
Software that is processed by the pipeline is exclusively firmware for the developed
hardware products.
Severity of an outage?
Outages would be a major inconvenience for the developers. Despite the pipeline being at
a level of continuous integration. New code that is build during a not working pipeline
could not be tested automatically. Doing the tests manually would be theoretically
possible but not practically. The work Jenkins does automatically takes about 20 minutes
compared the expected manual time effort of 3+ hours. As a result code that is developed
during an outage does not get tested and it is insecurity about new code is growing
among developers.
Recovery time from an outage connected to unintended changes a deployment pipeline?
Fixing slips is estimated to take about 10 minutes after the discovery that such an
slip exist. If there is an larger problem such as a not working Jenkins installation
this takes about two days because the reset of such an installation is done by another
department.
What extends the pipeline to prohibit unintended configuration changes?
There are no specific prevention techniques in place to prevent the outage of a pipeline.
Infrastructure as code is used to undo problematic changes as fast as possible.
Testing the pipeline is done to which extend?
This question was scraped due to the similarity to the previous question 3.13.3.
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Lack of automation prohibiting deployment pipelines?
Automation is not prohibiting continuous deployment pipelines. The fear of having only
unit tested software in production, the mentality of developing new products and lack
of a need for building a automated deployment pipeline are the main problems. Since
product life cycles are such long time spans the need to deploy new software faster, a
process that takes currently about two days, is not seen as a desirable target.
3.13.5 Case Study Summary at Company Beta
The company is processing towards more automated deployment techniques. It is
however explicitly said that the final step of continuous deployment is not a desired
target. A well functioning pipeline is convenient and improves the development process
but outages or errors of the pipeline are already rare. These rare outages do not
take long to resolve. The outages of a pipeline are not seen by clients or even other
depending departments in the company. A not working pipeline is a inconvenience
during development. The usage of infrastructure as code was enough to satisfy the needs
of the company in regard to the configuration of a pipeline. The interviewed expert has
a far-reaching knowledge of the pipeline. He build it and nobody else is changing it.
The human component is therefore largely eliminated to be a factor in non-deliberate
faults. Security is also taken into account when designing the pipelines. Usual security
measures are taken to prevent malicious changes towards the pipeline (e.g. passwords,
rights, ...).
3.14 Evaluation
The evaluation of the case studies is, similar to the planning, done by the recommended
procedure from Runeson and Höst [RH08]. The Evaluation however summarizes the re-
sults on suspected and discovered influence factors to later on classify and automatically
discover/prevent these factors. This is done in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Influences and Classification
In this chapter we take the raw data that resulted from the interviews in Chapter 3
and evaluate the results. Based on this evaluation, we build classification systems to
classify each of the identified influence factors. The first part of this chapter contains the
evaluation of both previously described interviews. In Chapter 3, the case studies were
designed, conducted and the raw data was displayed in Sections 3.9 and 3.12. This raw
data is analyzed here. Similar to the design, the analysis is also based upon Runeson
and Höst [RH08]. The analysis is structured by showing the results of those questions
supporting and confirming the assumed influence factors. These suspected influence
factors are then classified as identified influence factors in Section 4.3.
Identified influence factors are the foundation for the second part of this chapter:
Developing classification systems. The classification systems are capable of taking
information about some of the identified influence factors in deployment pipelines and
classifying those. These classification systems which are described in Section 4.6 can be
used to evaluate and improve any deployment pipeline against unintended configuration
changes.
4.1 Data Analysis Technique
Hypothesis generation [RH08] has already been done during research and design
in Section 3.2.1. The main hypothesis was that even small configuration changes
in automated environments (e.g., pipelines) can have catastrophic outcomes. The
hypothesis served as a prerequisite for formulating questions (seen in Section 3.4) and
conducting the case study. The corresponding analysis technique for direct case studies
is a qualitative data analysis [RH08]. For this exact reason the chosen data analysis
technique was qualitative analysis. To confirm the suspected influence factors, the
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selected qualitative data analysis technique was hypothesis confirmation. This technique,
like stated by the name, tries to confirm or deny the original hypothesis by techniques
like data triangulation [RH08] which were used to conduct this case study. The data
collection method already covers data triangulation. The conclusions are the identified
influence factors that can be seen in listing 4.3. These identified influence factors form
the body of knowledge that poses the results of this case study.
4.2 Qualitative Data Analysis
In this Section we show the results that are derived from both raw data sets in Sec-
tions 3.9 and 3.12. We only discuss results that we classified as identified influence
factors. These factors are shown and are justified on what basis the factor is considered
to be an identified influence factor. For the justification, the raw data that was gathered
during the interviews is used as reference. Negative results from the case study that
or results where the suspicion was not confirmed are ignored. The selected level of
formalism is therefore called "editing approach" [RH08]. The results shown during the
qualitative analysis are based upon the findings of the case study .
4.3 Identified Influence Factors
Out of all our suspected influence factors we derived five identified influence factors
from the raw data set in Sections 3.9 and 3.12. The first two influence factors we
identified are the absence of systematic tests and the growing number of conditions that
exist in pipelines. We discuss the identification of these influence factors in Section 4.3.1.
According to our research, pipelines sometimes contain unknown numbers of configura-
tion interfaces that are affecting the pipeline. We identified these unknown number of
configuration interfaces as our second influence factor which we discuss in Section 4.3.2.
The third influence factor that we identified in Section 4.3.3 is the faulty insertion of
slips while configuring the settings of a pipeline. As our fourth influence factor, we
identified the security of pipelines in Section 4.3.4. We discovered that security is a
matter that is already handled in some way or another, but there are unseen security
problems existing in pipelines. Our last identified influence factor is the current system,
how people approach pipeline code. We discuss this last identified influence factor in
Section 4.3.5.
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4.3.1 Conditions & Systematic Testing
In Sections 3.10.3 and 3.10.3 we discovered that all the examined pipelines are only
tested on a trial and error basis.
We also discovered that company Alpha has a set of pipelines which are no longer
just simple script files. These pipelines are serving multiple purposes (e.g., different
deployment targets, different testing branches). These pipelines are part of one single
project which contains logic and commands such as loops, conditions, exceptions,
and shared libraries. It was discovered in Section 3.10.3 that instead of giving each
branch/sub-team its own pipeline, the different pipelines are implemented using a
single scripted file but are logically separated by conditional statements. We consider
this to be a threat towards scripted software in general. However, expanding a single
sequential script towards complex software containing logic and assumptions could
result in dormant faults [ALRL04] that range from malicious intrusions [URS+17]
to outdated legacy code. Unintentionally changing a path through a pipeline while
another path through the pipeline is changed is likely. Software that is processed by a
pipeline is tested in multiple ways. The two conducted case studies revealed multiple
testing methods like unit-, smoke-, usability- and integration tests (see Sections 3.10.1
and 3.13.1 and Figure 3.2). According to Myers, Sandler, and Badgett [MSB11] testing
software automatically is important. The system itself deploying this software does
however not get tested automatically. Information from Section 3.10.3 suggests that
more sophisticated pipelines are turning slowly into complex software that is more than
just a couple lines of script code.
In the evlauated non-continuous deployment pipelines, a bug is currently not considered
to be a big problem (see Section 3.13.3). The result of the used continuous techniques
is never bound to a production environment. The deployment pipelines are working on
manual triggers and not automatically. If a bug is discovered in such a non-continuous
deployment pipeline, a developer is always there to fix it, since the process was triggered
by a developer (like it was described in Section 3.11). We highly recommend that bugs
are considered to be a bigger problem in continuous deployment practices. We have seen
in Section 3.11 that pipelines that are connected to the production environment, can
have outages in which the production environment is affected by changes in the pipeline.
We therefore consider this influence factor as dangerous because testing is usually the
part of software that gets mostly neglected [MSB11]. Additionally, automatically testing
pipelines is more relevant once a continuous deployment is practiced. Both interviewed
experts stated that, at their current state, the outage of a pipeline is not dramatic at all
(see Sections 3.10.4, 3.13.3 and 3.13.4).
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4.3.2 Number of Configuration Interfaces
At company Beta, where there are only a limited amount of resources distributed towards
pipelines, we discovered slight evidence in Sections 3.13.3 and 3.13.3 that the number
of interfaces and values that are affecting a pipeline are getting out of hand. We propose
a solution to this problem in Section 5.2. However, to confirm this problem of loosing
an overview of all the possibilities that a pipeline can change, it would require a larger
dataset then the data set that the two case studies provide. A similar problem in company
Alpha could not be found. The centralization of services (described in Section 3.10.3) is
resulting in a clear overview of what is accessible and what not.
4.3.3 Insertion Slips
This was suspected to be one of the most influential factors during our research. Com-
pany Beta with their continuous integration pipeline did confirm in Sections 3.13.3
to 3.13.4 that insertion slips are an influencing pipeline behavior. Company Alpha
however explicitly denied that slips are considered to be a problem. The usage of specific
departments for pipeline tools and the building of drop down menus for required String
parameters has prevented all input errors (see Section 3.10.3). We would however
conclude that this was only made possible because of the amount of resources that
were distributed towards building a stable pipeline environment for a large number of
projects and development teams. The insertion of slips is a problem which has been
successfully handled by company Alpha but not company Beta. Nonetheless it is an
influence factor on pipelines. Company Alpha has already handled it in their continuous
delivery pipelines while company Beta has still sometimes problems with insertion
slips. The problems that company Beta still has are maybe acceptable in a continuous
integration pipeline but the problems that their expert described in Section 3.13.3 would
be dangerous if they would exist in a continuous deployment pipeline.
4.3.4 Pipeline Security
The security of pipelines is an untypical point in this list of identified influence factors.
Most importantly, in both visited companies there is a sense of security at some level.
Several security measures are taken by both companies (see Sections 3.10.2 and 3.13.2)
to prevent unauthorized access towards their pipelines and the corresponding environ-
ments. Also, Bass et al. [BHR+15] indicate that companies be concerned about pipeline
security in general. Pipeline security is therefore an identified influence factor which is
already addressed by both companies in which the case studies were conducted. How
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far the security has to be taken to sufficiently prevent malicious change attempts is a
different topic which we briefly address in the improvement development to security
threats to pipelines (Section 5.3).
An interesting observation that was made during the interviews is that Jenkins files are
currently stored inside the regular repository in which each developer that develops the
project has access. According to the experts, both companies made the conscious decision
of giving each developer access rights to change the integration/delivery pipeline of the
projects in which they are developing. This seems to be a doubtful decision because
in both observed projects there are limited amount of people which are considered
to be the pipeline experts (See Sections 3.10.3 and 3.13.3). These experts are the
ones who regularly change/modify/extend or build new pipelines. Additionally, both
companies have enabled the Jenkins authentication with different accounts for each
developer. Since Jenkins mainly holds the pipelines, it seems that at some point the
security of the pipeline had a higher value. Security was then neglected for the benefits of
infrastructure as code and the obstacle of having files inside a repository which are only
used by a limited amount of people using the repository. Since security is already taken
into consideration by companies that are just using continuous integration/delivery,
it seems even more important in a more automated environment such as continuous
deployment.
4.3.5 Engaging Pipeline Logic
In both case studies conducted, a common factor when talking about how the experts
learned about pipelines was found. In both cases the experts started without any
knowledge about pipelines (see Sections 3.10.1 and 3.13.1). Learning how to build and
modify pipelines was a task that was learned during the development of the actually
used continuous integration/delivery pipelines. According to von Leitner [Lei17b] this
is already a bad approach.
Additionally, both experts had the benefit of starting on a green field. The used groovy
scripts were new to them but they started with empty files and not with hundreds of lines
of legacy groovy scripts from previous pipeline maintainers. While this is not ideal but
acceptable in continuous integration/delivery pipelines, it poses a problem in continuous
deployment pipelines. If there are development mistakes, errors and uninterpretable
code put into a pipeline, this simply means that, at the current state, new commits are
not able to be tested automatically. In continuous delivery pipelines this would prohibit
the delivery in this exact moment. Continuous deployment pipelines however are also
handling the deployment to the production environment [SBZ17]. At some point such a
pipeline has to take the old code from the production environment and replace it with
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the new code. If an error is made during this stage the production environment would
stay offline until the a new deploy is made (see Section 3.11).
Connecting untrained maintainers and a production environment is from our perspec-
tive dangerous and has to be addressed at some point during the transition towards
continuous deployment pipelines. Especially, if we consider the developments that are
made by current pipeline maintainers. All of those advancements have to be learned
retrospectively by new maintainers. Is the process of engaging pipelines in continuous
deployment pipelines the same as the process in engaging continuous integration/de-
livery pipelines, we predict that serious unintended changes are going to be made. We
therefore identified the lack of pipeline training as an identified influence factor.
To prevent misunderstandings, it has to be said that both experts build them selfs new
pipeline dummies to test their changes before copy and pasting them into the actual
pipelines. On the one hand this is better than actually code testing in production
pipelines, but it would require a real testing environment in continuous deployment
pipelines, since the deployment process is significantly more error prone due to the
production activity of the server/software. This current state of building a dummy
pipeline in Jenkins would be no longer sufficient in continuous deployment pipelines.
This relates to Section 4.3.1 where we already mentioned the lack of testing in pipelines
in general.
4.4 Reporting the Case Study
following the guidance that was given by Runeson and Höst [RH08], we give a short
summary about the report of this case study. Runeson and Höst [RH08] refer to Yin
[Yin03] when reporting a case study. Up to this point, the entire thesis is the report of
the conducted case study. Each task that is required for a linear-analytical approach was
processed. The linear-analytical reporting style is according to Runeson and Höst [RH08]
"the most accepted structure" for case study reports. The five stages of linear-analytical
reporting are shown in listing 4.4. Each point also contains the information of where it
was addressed.
• The problem that this thesis is engaging was shown in Chapter 2 Section 2.1
• Related work was covered in Chapter 2 Section 2.6
• Methods on how to engage unintended configuration changes where discussed
in Chapter 3. The chapter explains in great detail how designing, building and
conducting the case studies was done.
• Analysis of the data collected in the case studies was done in Section 4.2.
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• The conclusion of a case study on hypothesis confirmation would be a boolean
response. To enhance this conclusion the identified influence factors that are
resulting out of the data analysis are the concluded dangerous entities that have
to be handled by the classification system (seen in Section 4.6) and the following
improvement approaches.
4.5 Case Study Validity
The following sections and chapters will focus on improving pipelines based on the
identified influence factors. The question however remains how valid the discovered
results are. We took Wohlin et al. [WRH+12] into account to check the validity of the
conducted case study. This Section will go through the provided validity checklist. The
checklist mentions four main points of validity which are split into multiple subcategories.
We hereby discuss each given sub category and its relevance in context to our conducted
case study.
4.5.1 Conclusion Validity
This part of validity is trying to figure out if the case study has the ability to draw correct
conclusions from our discovered results. In other words are the conclusions that we
made in Section 4.3 valid conclusions between the treatment and the outcome of the
conducted case study [WRH+12].
• The low statistical power that the case study is providing is rooted in the fact that
the resources of this thesis are limited. A higher statistical power with the given
resources would only be able if the chosen data analysis would be quantitative
instead of qualitative. Since this is an exploratory case study, the proposed data
analysis technique is the qualitative data analysis [RH08] which in turn makes it
almost impossible to get a high statistical power from exploratory case studies with
the given amount of resources. We therefore consider the low statistical power a
threat to validity in our case study.
• Violated assumptions of statistical tests is a possible threat that we can ignore in
the validity concern. Due to the fact that no statistical approaches were taken, it is
impossible to get faulty conclusions from such tests.
• Fishing for specific conclusions is a threat to conclusion validity that has a high
impact in this thesis. The questions (see Section 3.4) that formed the interview
all where designed to discover a specific possible threat/error source. We tried to
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counteract the fishing problematic by first building a set of raw data that contains
the results from both case studies (Seen in Sections 3.9 and 3.12). The raw data
sets are the results from both interviews. They contain the results of both interviews
without any from of interpretation or conclusion drawing. Drawing conclusions
was only started after both data sets were finished. Our countermeasures however
do not completely cover the "fishing" threat. We therefore consider fishing for
conclusions a valid threat to validity.
• The error rate for a qualitative analysis is non existent since a researcher was
conducting the interviews. Each occurred misunderstanding was resolved during
the interview. Errors that originate from an insufficient formulated question in the
dataset are therefore not existing and can be ignored.
• The reliability of measures is highly problematic. The measured data is collected
from human beings which makes it, to a certain degree, subjective data. We
tried to counteract possible lies due to insecurity or fear. We designed the case
study in a way in which we tried to build an environment and a relationship
(See Section 3.2.3) with the interviewed expert so that fears are non existent. It
is however impossible to be 100% sure whether an expert was lying or not. In
our evaluation of the case studies we talked to another expert to verify whether
our measured data and conclusions are accurate. We do however consider the
reliability of measures a threat to validity.
• Reliability of treatment implementation is no threat to validity. The treatment
(here the interview) was conducted by the same interviewer with the same set of
questions (with exception from protocol improvements in Section 3.6 that were
proposed by [RH08]) in the same time frame without any pressure. The setting
was as similar as possible the same for both interviews.
• Random irrelevancies in the experimental setting are irrelevant in our case. Ran-
dom irrelevancies do not change the data that we collected and can therefore be
dismissed. This is because we did not have an experimental setting.
• Heterogeneity of subjects was not given. Both interviewed experts were chosen
based on their experience with with the topic. They both have a comparable
knowledge about their pipelines. Since the number of subjects is only two, it is not
likely to contain an error either.
4.5.2 Internal Validity
According to Wohlin et al. [WRH+12] we have to differentiate between single- and multi
group threats when talking about internal validity of a case study. We conducted two
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interviews in different companies. Our case study was therefore conducted in multiple
groups. Calling two groups "multiple groups" is for our impression of a valid case study
not sufficient. We therefore evaluated our case study based on both, single- and multi
group threats to internal validity. Internal validity is trying to verify whether there are
influences which alter the results of the case study while the researcher is not knowing
about these influences [WRH+12].
• Wohlin et al. [WRH+12] states that the history of the interviewed experts may
alter the results gathered from the interview. It may be impossible to exclude
that there are events from which we had no knowledge about, but we did our
best to gather information in an environment that is as normal as possible. Both
interviews were conducted on a normal workday (which was neither Monday nor
Friday). The interviews took place shortly before/after lunch and had sufficient
time scheduled to conduct them.
• During the design of our case study we explicitly included the process of
maturation. We described in Section 3.4.1 that the first set of questions is not
necessarily asked to gain information, but bring both interviewer and interviewee
on a equal base of understanding. We additionally mention that in both interviews
the experts were interested and did not loose interest over time. Maturation is
however not considered to be a problem. There are no tasks that can be learned
faster or better. The maturation time that is taken at the beginning of the case
study is simply to get both interviewee and interviewer on the same page.
• Testing or more accurately including the learning curve in repetition is not a
problem since we did not conduct any tests.
• Instrumentation is not considered a problem. We did not hand out anything to
the interviewed expert. There are no instruments used besides a recording device
and the question protocol. Both were only used by the interviewer and not the
interviewed expert.
• Statistical regression is only relevant if the observed subjects (here which pipelines
were used to gather information from) are classified in previous statistical studies
or experiments. This was not the case and we therefore dismiss this as a possible
threat to validity.
• Selection is relevant since pipelines that are observed had to be selected. We
already described that while defining the case in Section 3.2.1 we investigated
regular pipelines. The raw data of the case studies in Sections 3.9 and 3.12 verify
this. We do not think that the selection of using regular pipelines is posing a
problem for the validity of our pipelines.
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• Mortality is only relevant if there are dropouts from the interviews. We did not
have any dropouts and can discard mortality as a problematic validity threat.
• Ambiguity about direction of causal events is not relevant in our case study. We
did not investigate what the cause for the discovered problems is. We did just
collect the data about possible influence factors and whether they confirm or
dispute our suspicion.
• Interactions with selection is according to [WRH+12] the different results that
can be gained from different people since they have a different learning speed. The
maturity is different. Since we did not give any tasks to the interviewed experts
we can disregard this threat to validity.
• Diffusion or imitation of treatments is not considered a problem. Both experts that
were interviewed work in different companies and do not know each other. They
do not know the other person and can therefore not be influenced by them.
• Compensatory equalization of treatments is irrelevant because we did not give
any compensations to experts that we interviewed.
• Compensatory rivalry is also irrelevant since the people contributing to the inter-
views do not know each other.
• Resentful demoralization is also irrelevant since the people contributing to the
interviews do not know each other.
4.5.3 Construct Validity
Construct validity is questioning whether the results or the concepts can be generalized.
These threats to validity can originate from the design or social factors [WRH+12]. The
design refers to the building of the case study while social threats are concerned with
different behaviors that subjects of the case study may offer during its execution.
• Inadequate preoperational explication of constructs is concerned with insufficient
description of wanted results. We however did an exploratory case study. We
explored what the current state of pipelines is and did not want to get specific
results from the case study. We therefore do not consider this threat to validity as
a relevant factor.
• Mono-operation bias refers to the usage of single objects that are part of an ex-
periment. We used two different pipelines as investigated objects. More pipelines
would be even better but we used more than one, which is eliminating single
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occurrences. The fact that each pipeline was only observed through an inter-
view of one expert is more relevant. We however can not exclude the fact that
misunderstandings or false information was given.
• Mono-method bias is an even larger threat to validity than the previously men-
tioned ’Mono-operation bias’. In both inspections of a pipeline we only conducted
interviews. It is even suggested by Runeson and Höst [RH08] that interviews are
the preferred method for exploratory case studies. The problem of having only a
single method is that possible suspected influence factors that could have been
discovered through e.g., statistical analysis were not discovered with our setup of
interviews.
• Confounding constructs and levels of constructs is concerned with different
lengths of experiences an expert has with a pipeline. Although there are dif-
ferent levels of experiences in the conducted interviews, we included this concern
in the design of the case study in Section 3.4.1. We discovered that both experts
are in a state in which they still have to work on something, but they both were not
completely new to the topic. We consider their experiences to be on a comparable
level and do not think that this validity threat is given in our case study.
• Interaction of different treatments is discarded as a validity threat because only
one single interview was conducted with each expert. They did not participate in
any similar interview prior to our conducted one.
• Interaction of testing and treatment is discarded as a problem. We did only gather
information on a single point in time. During our interviews the pipelines did not
change. Even if the experts are now more aware of the problems that may have
shown during the interviews, it would not alter the results of the single interview
that we had with the expert.
• Restricted generalizeability across constructs is concerned with having positive
effects on a measured results but has negative impacts on other not measured
facts. Since our raw data in Sections 3.9 and 3.12 does not compare or measure
specific data points we do not see this problem in our data gathering. We explicitly
recognize this problem in our solution development in Section 5.4 where we
discovered that the influence factor of slips can be reduced by adding additional
complexity to the pipeline itself, but this does not change the validity of the
collected data or the resulting identified influence factors.
• Hypothesis guessing by the expert would maybe change the information that is
given by him. During the design of the case study in Section 3.4 we already
covered the fact that behind most questions is a hypothesis that we try to confirm.
We also mentioned the fact that we actively hide the hypothesis to the expert to
prevent any change in behavior. Due to the fact that we had this threat to validity
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already in mind while designing the case study we do not think that it poses a
problem in our case study.
• Evaluation apprehension is concerning human behavior. Humans try to look good
while being evaluated. The concern is that this ’looking better behavior’ is changing
the results. For this exact reason we designed our first block of questions. Like
explained in Section 3.4.1 the first set of questions is not asked to gain critical
information but rather to set up a secure environment. In a secure environment it
is less likely for a human to show-off about their work.
• Experimenter expectancies is concerned with the prejudices that the interviewer
might have. Unfortunately this thesis is only conducted by on person which does
not make it possible to have different people doing the interviews. We tried to
counteract the prejudices that the interviewer might have by starting with a raw
data collection (Seen in Sections 3.9 and 3.12). In this raw data section we did
not do anything in regard to interpreting the data. We had our attempts to prevent
prejudices in this case study, but due to the fact that only one person is working
on this thesis it is impossible to know for certain if there where no subconscious
prejudices altering the behavior of the interviewer during the interview.
4.5.4 External Validity
External validity is concerning all factors that may prevent the results of this case study
to be generalized to other pipelines [WRH+12].
• Interaction of selection and treatment is approaching the topic of selecting the
target group. Ideally, each group that exist in reality is represented equally. One
of the pipelines that we observed is existing in a rather small company, while the
other pipeline is existing in a large company (See Sections 3.8.1 and 3.8.2). In
both cases we took regular pipelines as our observatory target. This selection
could be expanded by other groups such as medium sized companies or one man
projects. We however do not think that the selection that we have is posing a
validity problem in regard to the selected group.
• Interaction of setting and treatment is targeting the validity of the setup. We did
not use any tools in the interview and therefore can ignore this threat to validity.
• Interaction of history and treatment is similar to the validity concern of ’History’.
We took a usual workday which is neither Monday nor Friday to conduct our
interview. There was more time scheduled to conduct the interviews than needed.
We therefore disregard this threat to validity.
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4.5.5 Validity conclusion
This Section discussed the checklist of threads to validity that is provided by Wohlin et al.
[WRH+12]. We now discuss the validity problems and what this means for conclusions
that can be drawn from the thesis. We further discuss the relevance of the upcoming
chapters that pose solutions in regard to the discovered identified influence factors. To
summarize this Section we list all the threats to validity that pose a threat to our case
study here.
• Low statistical power
• Fishing
• Reliability of measures
• Mono-operation bias
• Mono-method bias
• Experimenter expectancies
The most important validity threat is the low statistical power. It is similar to the
validity threat of mono-operation bias. The two cases at different companies that we
observed is already above average number of cases that a thesis usually contains. To
gain a higher statistical power it would be necessary to either increase the number
of resources distributed to the topic (e.g., people, timeframe) or transition from an
qualitative approach to an quantitative approach. Doing a quantitative approach on
an exploratory case study would however contradict the guidelines from Runeson and
Höst [RH08] on which this case study was largely based. During our research we found
information on a qualitative case study in which 15 data points (different companies
where questioned) in Leppänen et al. [LMP+15]. We can use this as a point of reference
and assume that approximately 15 companies would be a sufficient statistical power for
a qualitative case study.
The validity threats of fishing and experimenter expectancies are closely related. Both
are aiming at the interviewer that is conducting the interview. To ensure that the validity
of the case study is not compromised we would use multiple different experts to conduct
the interviews. Like already explained this can’t be done due to the fact that only one
person is working on this thesis.
How reliable the measured data is is questionable. To ensure that interview answers are
reliable there would have been some sort of control value (e.g., asking experts working
on the same pipeline separately the same questions). We did our best to build a safe
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environment so that the interviewed expert did not have to fear anything and would
give reliable answers in the first place.
Mono-method bias is concerned about the fact that we used only one technique to
conduct the case study. Due to the low statistical power it is however questionable if it
would be useful to use another method for the second interview. Especially including the
fact that the question protocol for the interview was improved after the first interview
was conducted.
To summarize we can see that all validity threats are originating from conclusion and
construct. Internal and external validity seem to be unproblematic. All the discovered
threats to validity could be resolved by using more people, companies and time.
4.6 Classifying Identified Influence Factors
The previously identified influence factors pose a potential threat to continuous deploy-
ment pipelines. The reader of this thesis might now ask at what point action has to be
taken to reduce or prevent the risk of such an influence factor. We therefore provide
a method to classify the identified influence factors. These are however just rough
guidelines. In the end, the decision on how dangerous an identified influence factor
is, and how much resources are distributed towards protecting a pipeline against such
an influence factor, has to be done by pipeline maintainers themselves. We already
mentioned in Section 4.3.1 that there is evidence that pipelines are slowly transforming
into more complex software projects. The measures that are here proposed are only
proposals to ensure a well working pipeline.
4.6.1 Classifying Slip Origins & Configuration Interfaces
Slips and the number of configuration interfaces where both discovered as identified
influence factors. As it turns out, these are both closely related. A slip can only be made
in a configuration interface. Configuration interfaces can also contain slips while they
are changed. We discovered two relevant factors for slips and configuration interfaces.
The first is the number of times a value inside an interface is changed or a slip can occur
only if a change is made. This is the only time a change occurs. It is therefore the only
time in which a fault can be generated. In case of pipeline outages it is possible that
the production environment is effected like we described in Section 2.1. We discovered
during our observation in Section 3.11 that this is in fact possible. The worst case
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scenario of pipeline outages is that they are affecting the availability of the production
environment.
The second factor that plays a role is therefore the availability of the pipeline. These
two factors (change frequency and availability-loss aka severity) are closely related to
the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [OWA18]. We therefore based our classification
system of slips and interfaces upon this system. OWASP [OWA18] however evaluates
the overall risk severity based upon the abstract likelihood and impact. Since this
classification system should be a guidance for readers, we specify these. Impact of a
pipeline outage is classified into the three categories instead of the provided abstract
low medium and high. The three categories are:
• Effects not noticed by users
• Effects noticed by users but still working
• Fatal System/Subsytem outage
The likelihood that an error occurs is the change frequency. We use the availability
zones that described the availability of an application in Gray and Reuter [GR92]. The
availability zones can also be seen in 4.6.1
• High Availability - 99.999% Available - 5 minutes outage per year allowed
• Available - 99.99% Available - 50 minutes outage per year allowed
• Well Manged - 99.9% Available - 9 hours outage per year allowed
• Managed 99% Available - 90 hours outage per year allowed
• Unmanaged 90% Available - 900 hours outage per year allowed
The availability is however impacted by the MTTR (Mean Time To Repair) of a pipeline
and not just the occurrence of an outage. Since outages originate from a change to the
configuration we assume, like OWASP [OWA18] proposes, the worst case. The worst
case being that every unintended change is resulting in a fatal outage. The resulting
calculation for the likelihood of OWASP is shown in 4.6.1
ChangesPerY ear ∗MTTRofPipelineInHours < AllowedOutagePerY earInHours
If we apply values to the specified cornerstones of the OWASP Risk rating methodology
we get the result which is shown in Figure 4.1. Important to mention is that the interface
identification can be improved and made more fine grained by considering each value
inside an interface as a here described interface. This has the benefit of being more
precise since interfaces are just an accumulation of configuration values. On the other
hand this drastically increases the effort spent to classify the pipeline.
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Figure 4.1: Classification System Slips & Interfaces based on Chapter 3, [OWA18] and
[GR92]
Using the Classification System for Slips & Interfaces
In this Section we described how the classification system should be used. We describe
the usage by an example for which we take the data that has been gathered in the case
study at company Alpha. In this example we evaluate the classification of an slip in
company Alpha. The expert mentioned in Section 3.10.4 that pipeline errors are not
visible to clients. The other needed information is the mean time to repair of the pipeline
and the changes per year. It was mentioned in Section 3.10.3 that the pipeline changes
every two weeks on average. This would result in a change frequency of 26 changes per
year. The mean time to repair , which was described in Section 3.10.4, is about six hours.
To use the classification system we multiply the mean time to repair with the number
of changes per year and get 156h. We now plug all the gathered information into the
classification system in Figure 4.1. The selected row and column cross in a "High" risk
cell. This matches the reality that was described in Section 3.10.3 were it was described
that the pipeline has to be tested and it is on the list of high priority changes.
4.6.2 Classifying Conditions and Testing Requirements
According to Humble and Farley [HF10] and Myers, Sandler, and Badgett [MSB11]
testing software is important. The more test cases exist for a software project the more
likely it is to uncover a bug inside the software [MLBK02]. We previously discovered in
Section 3.10.3 that some pipelines evolve from single sequential scripts into complex
programs. We also discovered in Section 3.13.3 that testing on a trial and error basis
can be successful in singular sequential code flows. This classification should now tell
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at what point it would be necessary to implement (automated) tests for a pipeline. We
did however not find any information related to the topic. In an ideal world there are
tests for every software. Literature always assumes that software is automatically tested.
The decision on when to implement tests to a project (in this case the pipeline) has to
be done by each individual maintainer. We do not have reliable information at what
point trial and error testing is no longer sufficient and automated testing has to be
implemented. Our suggestion is however to implement the first automated test as soon
as a single if-condition is existing. The first condition is transforming simple sequential
code that is tested by trial and error, into code in which dormant faults (see Avizienis
et al. [ALRL04]) can exist. The outage that we observed in Section 3.11 was caused by
a misconfiguration in a pipeline which had a fairly simple control flow (see Figure 3.5).
The control flow itself was not the problem, but it shows that bugs can appear even in
simple pipelines.
4.6.3 Classifying Security
Research prior to the case study already suggested security may be a problem. This
was confirmed during the case studies (see Section 4.3.4). The security aspects in
pipelines are however not too different from other digital environments. How to classify
security in software projects is a topic which other sources (e.g. Allen et al. [ABE+08],
Ullah et al. [URS+17]) investigate in a detailed manner. Security can be improved by
adding additional security layers. We discuss in Section 5.3, how pipeline security can
be improved, especially by limiting unrestricted access to pipelines by developers. How
much is done and how many resources are distributed towards the security is a decision
every team has to do on a subjective basis.
4.6.4 Classification of the Engagement of Pipeline Logic
Much like the previous two identified influence factors, we could not develop a hard
data classification table on how to classify or rank this influence factor. We however
made a list of requirements that have to be fulfilled. If all questions to the list that are
seen in Section 4.6.4 are answered with "yes" we would propose to consider the pipeline
a problem in context of this influence factor. We propose that the approach on which
new pipeline maintainers/developers engage the pipeline is significantly different from
the approach that the observed companies made. The manner in which new experts are
currently trained was discovered in Sections 3.10.1 and 3.13.1 and is not an acceptable
approach in pipelines that meet all the specified criteria. Additionally, we would like to
mention that this influence factor is the only one which is not of technical origin but of
human capabilities.
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• Is there a medium to large amount of legacy pipeline code snippets?
• Is the pipeline containing any conditions, loops, exceptions?
• Is there a practical way to test the pipeline and its behavior without affecting
production?
• Is the discussed pipeline affecting the live environment? Deployment pipeline or
continuous deployment pipeline?
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Chapter 5
Measures to Improve Pipelines
In Chapter 4, we took all suspected influence factors from Chapter 3 and identified the
ones that are actually posing problems. In this chapter, we propose techniques and
ideas that detect and/or compensate for changes in a pipeline. Importantly to note is
that no matter what improvement is used in a pipeline, it is only going to improve the
safety or security. It is possible that even when an improvement method is implemented
that there are still problems with the pipelines safety/security unrelated to the problem
that we built improvements for. Additionally, we mentioned in Section 3.2.2 that we
do explicitly ignore certain factors (e.g., Network, Hardware) that are necessarily also
affecting pipeline behavior. Each measure contains the information whether it is a
preventive measure or a measure to improve recovery. Each improvement also explains
how it differentiates unintended and intended changes to pipelines. This differentiation
is important because an abstract validation of a specific programs correctness is not
possible due to the halting problem [Sch01].
5.1 Improving Pipeline Testing by Conditional Execution
We concluded in Section 4.3.1 that pipelines are still tested manually by trial and error.
We hereby propose two solutions on how testing for pipelines could be improved.
5.1.1 Testing Environment
The first solution was already considered by the interviewed expert at company Beta,
as was described in Section 3.13.3. Providing an additional testing environment for
software that runs through a pipeline, to see if a pipeline produces the required results.
The pipeline for this environment has to be the same that is used to deploy to production.
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Algorithmus 5.1 Generic Code Example for an Testing Environment
procedure PIPELINEFLOW
generic pipeline code (e.g. compiling)
generic pipeline code (e.g. testing)
DEPLOY(Target (e.g. IP-Address): testEnvironment)
DEPLOY(Target (e.g. IP-Address): ProdEnvironment)
end procedure
The different pipeline environment target should be set with a simple boolean input
(e.g., check box, same method) to differentiate between production and the testing
environment or doing it sequentially. This testing environment is used to discover if the
pipeline itself is producing the required results. It is important to use the same pipeline
or respectively the same code to deploy to test and production for this process to ensure
reliable results. This additional testing environment would serve as a preventive system
to improve a pipeline against unintended changes. It can be automated to the point
in which it can be set as the step inside a pipeline itself (see Algorithm 5.1) before the
deployment process to production is started. The differentiation between unintended
and intended changes are only then automatically detected if the pipeline is crashing
during its execution. It is additionally possible to block further deployment to production
if the pipeline has changed and it has to be turned off by implementing a custom Jenkins
plug in. The production blockade would then be resolved by an authorized personnel
signing off manually.
5.1.2 Canary Analysis
The second option would be the implementation of canary analysis mentioned in Section
2.6.4. Canary analysis was originally designed to ensure that new software systems that
are deployed to production are only seen by a small amount of customers that grow over
time. A rollback can be done in seconds since the old software version is still running.
As the expert at company Alpha described in Section 3.10.4, they implemented a similar
method under the name blue-green deployment. It has the desired effects of preventing
software errors to show in production to a larger audience. A positive side effect is that
if during the deployment process, or more precisely during the pipeline execution, an
error occurs in the wrong moment, the production environment will remain unaffected
for most customers. This method would also be defined as a preventive system. Small
amounts of customers would be sent to the unavailable software that was produced
through the broken pipeline. The bulk of users would not see any changes. Depending
on the effects of the wrongful configuration of the pipeline the canary analysis tool
86
5.1 Improving Pipeline Testing by Conditional Execution
Figure 5.1: Activity Diagram Unintended Interface Change Prevention Tool (UICPT)
(e.g., Kayenta 1) would see changed behavior in the live software that is used by a
small amount of people. The software can decide on custom set violated thresholds
that the new software is not correct. The reasons could be simple bugs in the software
or other reasons like an insufficient test that was not executed because of a wrongful
configured pipeline. The differentiation between intended and unintended changes is
happening partially automated depending on the set thresholds (e.g., Smoke tests see
Section Figure 3.2).
1https://github.com/spinnaker/kayenta
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5.2 Safeguarding Pipelines Against Unintended Changes in
Configuration Interfaces
This idea behind safeguarding the pipeline is trying to improve the situation (described
in Section 4.3.2) about the number of interfaces that are affecting a pipeline. Depending
on the size of the pipeline, a large amount of tools is used. Each of those tools has to
be configured in one way or another. A configuration is made through a graphical user
interface (GUI) or written text inside a configuration file (e.g., DSL). We identified the
number of interfaces as an influence factor in Section 4.3.2.
We propose a tool that stores a checksum, hash value or similar information for each
interface configuration file. The tool would be plugged into the pipeline. Each time the
pipeline is executed the tool checks whether the current checksum has changed. In case
of a changed interface, the tool prevents the pipeline from progressing. The tool has
then to be executed manually to update the current checksum/hash value. This has the
benefit of preventing changes in pipelines that should either not be made or that happen
unintentionally (e.g., an update that resets the configuration file).
The benefit of using checksums is that the tool is not using information about envi-
ronment, programming language or anything else. It is abstract and could be used in
any pipeline. Changes to a pipeline tool can result in any wrong behavior, from not
executing correct to a broken functionality that would otherwise not registered because
the pipeline is automated. Another benefit being that once a tool is plugged into the
pipeline, nobody has to remember it about because this tool will remind you if something
changed and has to be looked at. The relevant configuration files however have to be
inserted manually into the prevention tool.
The idea originates from Bass et al. [BHR+15] where a binary checksum is proposed to
see whether a malicious intrusion on a pipeline was done. The proposed internal work
flow of such a tool is visualized as an activity diagram in Figure 5.1. In this described
form the tool would only function as a preventive tool. Depending on the chosen data
storing method it would be possible to extend it towards a tool configuration repository
in which changes of all configuration files can be looked up. The differentiation between
intended and unintended changes is made by the person who is looking up the changed
interface due to the stopping of the pipeline. The downside of this approach is that a
manual step is introduced after updating any configuration interface that is part of the
pipeline. To some extent automation gets reduced to ensure a safer pipeline. Changes
from authorized personal are however not picked up with this prevention technique.
The tool also adds more work because each new pipeline tools configuration has to be
selected by this tool.
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Figure 5.2: Activity Diagram Unintended Interface Change Prevention Tool Implemen-
tation (UICPT)
5.2.1 Implementation UICPT
Based on the description in Section 5.2 and Figure 5.1, we implemented a prototype
that offers the described functionality. The implementation is capable of storing the
binary (complete binary instead of hash/checksum) of any given number of files. Each
file is given by a path in a file which only contains paths to interface configuration
files. Since this is a prototype, we ignored networking. The tool has two possible run
configurations. The first run configuration is the pipeline part in which it is validating
if the given number of paths and stored binaries is the same. After this first step of
validations it is checking whether each stored interface binary is matching the binary
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of the given path. In case that any of the validations are not correct the tool is trowing
an exception and is stopping further pipeline executions. The tool is displaying all
files that have changed in contrast to the stored ones so that human maintainers can
validate whether the change to the configuration was intended or not. Due to the fact
that the pipeline is stopped, we propose that the tool is inserted at the beginning of a
pipeline before the pipeline could change anything. The second run configuration is
updating the stored checksums. This run configuration is one which should be executed
manually after a pipeline maintainer added a new configuration file to the tool or a
change was detected. After updating the pipeline binaries, the pipeline run configuration
executes without throwing exceptions. Should a configuration file which is linked in
the tools configuration file change, the tool will start to throw exceptions again until
it is updated. This happens not only if a configuration file is changed but also if one is
deleted/added. The final version of the code flow that we explained here is visualized in
Figure 5.2. It is published as a public repository on Github. The location to the prototype
is https://github.com/GJohannes/Unintended-Interface-Change-Prevention-Tool.
5.3 Improving the Security of a Continuous Deployment
Pipeline
One possible source of unintended behavior to a deployment pipeline could be a ma-
licious attack. Bass et al. [BHR+15] discovered that concerns about such attacks in
deployment pipelines are concerns that already existed prior to this thesis. Changes
that are made with bad intentions are an equal damage source to accidental changes.
The origin of a faulty production state is usually not cared for. What matters is simply
the fact that the live environment is in an undesirable state. However, detecting a
malicious attack in a deployment pipeline is equally hard compared to every other
digital context. Additionally, just detecting this is not the recommended approach since
when a malicious attack was made it is usually too late to fix anything and it mostly is
obvious that an attack happened. It is wise to prevent malicious intrusions by taking the
usual security measures that every user of digital services should take. This includes the
use of appropriate authentication methods like long and complex passwords, adequate
encryption (e.g., TLS 1.2) and the role allocation that typical deployment pipeline tools
offer (e.g., AWS, Github). We highly recommend to consolidate other sources like
for example Ullah et al. [URS+17] that cover this topic as a core feature about their
work. Two pipeline-specific measurements that we discovered, are presented in the
following:
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Figure 5.3: EGit Checked out Main Project With Jenkinsfile Inside Submodule
Figure 5.4: Both Individual Repositories
5.3.1 Jenkinsfile
In Section 4.3.4 we described in detail that there seems to be a problem with access
rights to the Jenkinsfile. The problem is not just existing for Jenkinsfiles but for the
entire Infrastructure as Code concept. In Git, which is one of the most popular SCM
tools today, there are only four different permission levels [Git18]. None of which are
able to differentiate between contributors who already have write permissions.
A Jenkinsfile is mostly maintained by only a subset of people (see Section 3.10.3). Git
currently does not provide out of the box solutions for different authentication levels of
different files inside a single repository. This would however be the required solution that
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we would propose from a security point of view. People who do not work on a project
(e.g., pipeline script) should not have access to it. We found a possible workaround to
this problem by using submodules in Git (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4). By adding another
repository as a submodule which only contains the Jenkinsfile, it is possible to assign
write rights to only a couple of people who edit the pipeline while everyone can still
have read access. We vigorously point out that this is only a workaround. Submodules
are not designed to work as access right restrictions. Updating them to the latest
commit in the parent repository is not as easy as it could be. The path to the Jenkinsfile
inside the Jenkins pipeline configuration would then be adapted. An Example how
the path would then look like in accordance to the prototype set up in Figures 5.3
and 5.4 would look like this: (MainRepositoryFolder)/SubModule/javaCodeSubModule/
src/javaCodeSubModule/(LocationOfJenkinsfile). This method of using submodules
would improve security by restricting access, but it would increase the complexity of the
procedure to an extent that we suspect it is likely to generate unintended faults by using
it. Aside from this workaround we did not find any working alternative to restrict write
permissions inside a Git repository.
5.4 Reducing the Number of Slips while Inserting Pipeline
Parameters
Research suggested and the case study at company Beta confirmed that slips are potential
sources of errors. This section is discussing possible solutions that could reduce the
number of slips that are made in context of the configuration of pipelines.
5.4.1 IDE & Compiler
Jenkins files are based upon groovy scripts. Script based programming languages
are easier to reuse and result in higher programmer productivity, but the strength
of the resulting code is vastly decreased [Ous98]. Especially continuous deployment
pipelines are an important part of the development process which would benefit from
a strongly typed language. The first step that can improve the typing of a language is
the use of an IDE. Scripting languages are more flexible as compiled languages. An
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) for scripted languages can never have the
same strength as an IDE for a compiled language. An example that shows this would be
the type safety that is only resolved during runtime in scripted languages. An IDE for
a compiled language can display type violations while this can’t be done for a scripted
language. It is however possible to implement support like local syntax validation,
92
5.4 Reducing the Number of Slips while Inserting Pipeline Parameters
highlighting and other basic functions for scripted languages. The IDE support for these
basic functions was made in form of plug-ins for Eclipse called ’Jenkins Editor’ 2 and
INTELIJ called ’Jenkins Job DSL’ 3. The Jenkins Editor was created 2017-09-28 and has
since the gotten an average of 800 over downloads per month via the eclipse market
place. It offers some of the described basic functionality such as local syntax validation.
The next step, which is far more complex, would be the use of an additional compiler,
that may not be necessary but could resolve simple syntax errors before the script is
executed the first time. Due to the nature of scripting languages and the way Jenkins
groovy works this may be hard/impossible to implement. We do not have knowledge of
a project that is currently working on this. An IDE or a compiler are working as error
prevention techniques which do not validate changes based on the context of the change.
Both IDE and compiler are rather for syntax checking and reducing the complexity of
the written code due to coloring of variables.
5.4.2 Predefined Parameterization
If there are parameters that should be inserted into the pipeline to run it, we suggest that
this is done via selective predefined input methods (e.g. drop-down menus, check boxes,
etc.) to prevent the errors that can occur from slips. We propose that if there are any
values that have to be inserted by typing, that these values are rather inserted via one of
the previously described predefined input methods. We discovered in Sections 3.10.3
and 3.10.3 that company Alpha uses this method for the parameterized string values that
define which branch and which tests should be executed. We discovered in Section 3.10.3
that company Alpha does not see slips as a significant problem, mainly because of
this parameterization. This parameterization is one of the sources for the increased
complexity of pipelines. This is one of the reasons that lead to the assumption that
pipelines are transforming from simple scrips into complex software. This method of
predefined parameterization would work as an error preventing tool.
Predefined parameterization is a preventative technique which tries to prevent errors
from occurring by reducing the number of possible inputs. A differentiation between
intended and unintended slips is useless since a slip is always unintended. Preventing
the slip is always preventing the undesired behavior.
2http://marketplace.eclipse.org/content/jenkins-editor?mpc=true&mpc_state=
3https://github.com/jenkinsci/job-dsl-plugin
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5.5 Improving the Approach of Pipeline Logic
We mentioned in Section 4.3.5 that we could not provide exact data on how to classify
this influence factor. Improving the engagement of pipeline logic is similarly an organi-
zational problem. We are not even sure that it is a problem since we did not encounter
any expert in our two case studies that had to deal with all the factors that were listed
in Section 4.6.4. We would however propose to minimize this problem by tackling these
factors wherever it is possible.
5.5.1 Testing Environment
It is important to provide a separate test environment in which changes do not effect
the production in any way. In such a separate testing environment, maintainers can
test the changes that where made to the pipeline. This is even more important once
a pipeline maintainer/developer engages new custom groovy script. Custom made
software projects (e.g., plug-ins) that are developed in-house are more likely to contain
errors than large and popular open source projects that are accessible to the public. It is
therefore important to test pipeline behavior instead of just reading the documentation
about it.
5.5.2 Logic Containments & Affecting Live Environment
These two points are important to notice when trying to rate the stability of the pipeline.
It is however not always possible to improve upon this influence factor. In a continuous
deployment pipeline it is the desired effect that the production environment is affected
by the pipeline. It is possible to try and reduce logic to have a pipeline which is only
executed in a sequential flow. Depending on the project and environment this is not
always possible. An improvement to these two classification factors is therefore not
always possible.
5.5.3 Graphical Pipeline Builder
Jenkins pipelines are currently built by writing (Jenkins) groovy code. Some functions
are hidden behind specific syntax commands that have to be learned or looked up
(e.g. ’git url : ’https://github.com/GJohannes/baJenkins’’ to do a pull request from a
repository.) This process is simplified by Jenkins own snippet generator which is seen in
Figure 5.5. We know that such a snippet generator is a useful and simple tool for building
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Figure 5.5: Jenkins Snippet Generator
Figure 5.6: SharePoint Query Builder
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Figure 5.7: Example of coding in a Game Engine
DSL languages because we have seen similar approaches by for example Microsoft that
developed a content management system called SharePoint (see Figure 5.6).
However, we would propose to go a step further. We have discovered how complex
pipelines are looking and think that such a snippet generator is no longer sufficient,
especially since the snippet generator is only helping by building new pipeline parts.
Pipelines are large packs that are changing during their time in existence (see Sec-
tion 3.10.3). Pipelines are used to ’glue’ different functionalities together but their
current representation exclusively as code are violating two of Shneiderman [Shn10]
golden rules of interface design. Rule number two of universal usability and rule number
five for error prevention do not comply with the current state. Even simple mistakes like
character swaps in a command like "stage" or "setp" are hard to recognize before actually
running the pipeline if there is no syntax checker in place. According to [Shn10] rule
number five is preventing errors in human computer interfaces as much as possible.
We propose a pipeline builder in which pipeline blocks (e.g., currently existing snippets)
can be used via drag and drop to build a the pipeline code. Should the visual repre-
sentation not satisfy the need of the user it would still be possible to manually adjust
the resulting code. Additional functionality like conditions, loops and exceptions could
also be built by predefined GUI blocks like it is used in game development engines (see
Figure 5.7) or Scratch4. Should new custom functionality be implemented they would be
built as custom blocks which can then be dragged into the pipeline. The entire process
would be simpler and less error prone because the GUI can have additional information
like what each block requires as a precondition. It would also be easier to read into
existing pipelines because a flow of steps is visually easier represented. Slips like the in
Section 3.11 observed incident that had the root cause of an out of scope variable would
be non-existent. A graphical pipeline builder would reduce the complexity of pipelines.
4https://scratch.mit.edu/
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It tries to prevent errors by having the human changing the pipeline make less errors in
the first place by reducing the short term memory load of editors [Shn10].
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Chapter 6
Evaluation, Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the work done in this thesis. The first part in Chapter 6 is
an evaluation of the identified influence factors in Section 4.3. We presented them to
another third party expert who is independent from the two previously interviewed
experts. We used the feedback that was given by the expert to evaluate the results that
we concluded from the conducted interviews in Chapter 3. We presented the identified
influence factors and took the feedback on whether the expert could confirm them or
not. In Section 6.3 we show our conclusion of the case study. We discuss the original
motivation in relation to the results that we discovered. We conclude the thesis in
Section 6.4 in which we display the future work that we would suggest to be done
to reduce the number of unintended configuration changes in continuous deployment
pipelines.
6.1 Evaluation of the Identified Influence Factors
The main results of the case study are the identified influence factors. We tried to verify
our findings by presenting them to another 3rd party expert. The third party is a pipeline
expert at company Alpha. He is a consultant hired by the same company as the first
expert that was interviewed at company Alpha. He is working on a different project in a
similar environment than the expert that we interviewed in Section 3.9. The interviewed
expert is therefore independent from the previous expert that was interviewed in the
conducted case study in Chapter 3. We presented the identified influence factors to the
expert. The results of this evaluation interview are shown in the following section.
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6.1.1 Evaluational Setting
We took what we learned from the first interview in Section 3.6 and started the evaluation
interview with an introductory part. During this introduction a relaxed atmosphere
was the desired target. After introducing the expert to the topic we presented all our
identified influence factors.
6.1.2 Evaluation Execution
The interviewed expert is an external employee that is hired by company Alpha to teach
new developers how to develop software. Part of his job is the introduction of pipelines.
Amongst other things he helped to build previous continuous delivery pipelines for other
projects. The evaluation interview took place on a Monday afternoon. It took about half
an hour.
6.1.3 Conditions & Testing
The basis on which we identified this influence factor was discussed in Section 4.3.1.
We discovered that pipelines at company Alpha are complex software that is only tested
on a trial and error basis. These pipelines include complex logic like conditions, loops,
and exceptions. The expert acknowledged the fact that pipelines are growing in size and
complexity. He said that the logic that is included in pipelines is however necessary to
access the different environments (see Figure 3.2) while using a single pipeline. The
problem of having the code base untested was already acknowledged by the expert
that was originally interviewed in the case study. The external expert confirmed that
they are looking for a testing framework to test the groovy scrips. He did however not
see the testing framework as important as the expert that was originally interviewed.
He thought that that the different environments which are used for different testing
purposes (see Figure 3.2) are also serving as a testing environment for the pipeline. The
result being that the used testing environments are affected by a misconfigured pipeline
before production can be reached. The production environment should therefore never
be affected by a misconfigured pipeline. His view of this influence factor was that the
benefits of having logic to differentiate between pipelines outweigh the downsides of the
otherwise used copy and paste for building multiple pipelines for similar environments.
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6.1.4 Number of Configuration Interfaces
In Section 4.3.2, we discussed why this influence factor is considered to be an identified
influence factor. We concluded that some pipelines are at a size from which it is hard
to determine what the number of configuration interfaces is, from which the pipeline
behavior can be altered. The expert could not confirm this influence factor in his current
project at company Alpha. The number of tools that are used in the project in company
Alpha are limited by the management. Wherever it is possible the configuration of a tool
is put into the Git repository. We mention here that this influence factor was considered
to be identified on the basis of the interview at company Beta. We already discussed
in Section 4.3.2 that company Alpha seems to successfully have handled this influence
factor while company Beta is still struggling with it.
6.1.5 Insertion Slips
The basis on which we consider insertion slips to be an identified influence factor
was discussed in Section 4.3.3. Similar to the previous identified influence factor, this
identified influence factor was identified based on information from company Beta.
The expert however confirmed that insertion slips exist in their current environment
at company Alpha. He mentioned a case in which a manual version number input for
similar branches had to be made in the pipeline. Some branches have similar names. In
one case a wrong name was selected and a wrong version number for the corresponding
branch was deployed. We already suspected such a behavior in our original question
protocol in Section 3.4.3. The expert and his team made attempts to include predefined
parameterization wherever it is possible. A last human effort has to be made in every
case since the deployment process is still manually triggered. This last attempt seems to
have always exposed to insertion slips.
6.1.6 Pipeline Security
We identified this influence factor in Section 4.3.4. Both companies which are contribut-
ing information to this thesis are in a state in which each developer has write access
to the project repository. The repository contains not just application code but also the
configuration of the continuous pipeline. The authentication that was set in Jenkins
for each developer, in which not every developer had write access to the pipeline, was
bypassed. The expert told us that he currently does not consider this state to be a
problem. In their current state of continuous delivery it is only possible to trigger a
deploy by starting a deployment process manually in the graphical user interface of
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Jenkins. In case a transition towards continuous deployment would ever be made the
expert would not consider the absence of authentication a security problem. He would
rather classify the absence of authentication a process change in which it is made clear
that every developer has the capability to push to production.
6.1.7 Engaging Pipeline Logic
This last influence factor was identified in Section 4.3.5. We discovered that there is no
systematic approach on how new developers start to engage the already existing groovy
script that forms the pipeline. The production environment is possibly affected by the
pipeline which is modified on a trial and error basis. The expert acknowledged that they
do not have an systematic approach on how to train new pipeline maintainers. They all
start modifying code on the "production" pipeline code which is later on reviewed before
it is pushed to the master branch. Each "code path" for each environment (e.g., testing,
production. see Figure 3.2) has the same code base with the differentiation of branches
by predefined input parameters. Should a faulty change be made to a pipeline, it would
crash in a testing environment and not the production environment. Additionally, the
blue green deployment that is used by company Alpha (See Sections 2.6.4 and 3.10.4)
is preventing even a pipeline error in the production environment. They currently do
not consider the training of new pipeline maintainers to be a problem.
6.2 Discussion of Results
During our research in Section 2.4.2 we already discovered that the final implementation
of pipelines is always different. The fact that pipelines are always different results in
different influence factors in different pipelines. The last interviewed expert confirmed
some of our identified influence factors (e.g., Section 6.1.5) but also denied that some of
our identified influence factors are a problem form his point of view (e.g., Section 6.1.6).
As a matter of fact there are is definitely room for improvement to prevent unintended
configuration changes in pipelines. Each interview revealed at least some problems
in the current state of the pipeline. We would therefore conclude that the evaluation
interview indicates that influence factors exist, but they are different in each pipeline.
Our case study has shown on what basis we identified our influence factors. It is feasible
that there are others that we simply did not come across during our research and case
study.
Each pipeline that was discussed as a part of the case study (see Chapter 3) was not
a continuous deployment pipeline, but in a previous evolutionary state (continuous
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integration/delivery). Each pipeline however had influence factors that pose a problem
even in the current state. Each and every pipeline should be looked at and examined for
influence factors if a transition towards continuous deployment would ever be made.
6.3 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to verify or disprove the main hypothesis: Are there unin-
tended configuration changes possibly altering the behavior of continuous deployment
pipelines? The hypothesis was supported by the three main research questions that that
aimed at discovering and improving the state of pipelines in the context of unintended
configuration changes.
The first and most important research question (RQ.1) was to verify whether there are
unintended configuration changes in continuous integration/delivery pipelines affecting
the development process. RQ.1 was the main reason for the case study which we
conducted in Chapter 3. As a result of RQ.1 we derived five influence factors from which
unintended configuration changes can potentially originate.
RQ.2 was designed to classify pipelines on their potential to be affected by the identified
influence factors. We designed classification systems for each identified influence
factor. The classification systems pose a possibility to evaluate custom pipelines on their
weaknesses for unintended configuration changes. The classification systems can be
seen in Section 4.6.
RQ.3 was the last research question. In RQ.3 we proposed ideas for enhancement mea-
sures to prevent the identified influence factors from occurring in continuous deployment
pipelines. The improvements that we came up with are presented in Chapter 5.
As our result we conclude that unintended configuration changes are in fact affecting
pipeline behavior even in continuous integration/delivery pipelines. The case study
however revealed that the closer a company gets to continuous deployment the more
off problems are engaged. In our case study we have seen that company Beta is further
away from continuous deployment than company Alpha. Company Alpha has a more
sophisticated setup which contains less of our suspected/identified influence factors. The
identified influence factors that we discovered pose problems that are of rare occurrence.
If a company is transitioning their pipeline towards a continuous deployment pipeline,
we recommend to consider the identified influence factors that this thesis discovered in
Section 4.3. The identified influence factors are the sources of rather rare problems that
can potentially occur, but which can result in the worst case scenarios in an outage of
the complete production environment. In one sentence the prevention of the identified
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influence factor helps to prevent rare pipeline errors in which the worst cases are the
outage of the production environment.
6.4 Future Work
For future work in context of unintended configuration changes in continuous deploy-
ment pipelines we would like to see the following topics. The first topic that should be
addressed is the validity of the case study of this thesis. Our methods are scientifically
accurate, but with a statistical power of just two data sources, the case study should be
improved in further research. A case study which is based on the results of this case
study to remove all validity concerns that we had with our case study (See Section 4.5.5)
is necessary before further approaches are taken. We would propose a quantitative data
analysis [RH08] to verify our identified influence factors from Section 4.3. The second
topic is an evaluation of both the developed classification systems and the proposed en-
hancements that we developed in Section 4.6 and Chapter 5. The classification systems
were only partially evaluated based on the case study that we conducted to build the
classification systems. The enhancements that we came up with are sometimes simple
to build (e.g., number of configuration interface prevention Section 5.2) and sometimes
projects of their own (e.g., a graphical pipeline builder Section 5.5.3).
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